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Samandrag 
I denne oppgåva tek eg føre meg tre tekstar av Samuel Beckett: ”First Love”, ”The End” og 
”Texts for Nothing”. Målet mitt er å avdekke dei forskjellige uttrykka for begjær av ulike 
slag, gjennom ei nærlesing av dei tre tekstane og ved bruk av konsept og idear frå dei litterære 
teoriane psykoanalyse og poststrukturalisme. Eit viktig omgrep i tolkinga mi er 
‟inexpression‟, eit omgrep som vanskeleg lar seg omsetje, men som står for den 
grunnleggjande mangelen som ligg til grunn for begjær. Eg tar utgangspunkt i at det å feile 
inngår i Beckett sitt ‟livsoppdrag‟ kva gjeld kunst, det er ein viktig del av hans syn på kunst. I 
”First Love” er det først og fremst forteljaren sine problem med å uttrykke kjenslene sine som 
står i fokus – eit resultat av faren sin død, og det eg kallar ein slags ‟emosjonell forstopping‟. 
Forteljaren i ”The End” forsøker lenge å vere ein del av samfunnet han vandrar rundt i, men 
innser etter kvart at forsøka er fånyttes. Han slår seg til ro med si einsemd, og tar til takke med 
å overleve tom tiggar, og eige så godt som ingenting. Buande i eit lite båthus, merker ein at 
døden kjem stadig nærmare, fram til han fortel om ein visjon eller ein slags draum han har om 
at døden endeleg kjem og frigjer han frå alt håp om eit betre liv. I ”Texts for Nothing” er 
forteljaren knapt nok ein person, kanskje meir berre ei stemme, som forsøker å finne dei rette 
orda til å avslutte, til å bli ferdig med forteljing, med ord, for alltid. I eit forsøksvis 
konkluderande kapittel trekk eg fram at Beckett sitt livsoppdrag med kunsten sin – viktigheita 
av å feile – samt den alltid tilstadesverande usikkerheita i tekstane hans, gjer det vanskeleg å 
nå ein handfast konklusjon. 
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1. Introduction 
In a dialogue with Georges Duthuit, Samuel Beckett brings up the work of an acquaintance of 
his, Dutch painter Bram van Velde, to illustrate his opinion on contemporary art. Beckett 
expresses his admiration for van Velde‟s work, claiming that more painters should strive 
towards “[t]he expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, 
nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the 
obligation to express” (Beckett 1965: 103; emphasis added). This blatantly paradoxical 
utterance takes the shape of a narrow edge upon which I intend my thesis to balance. 
Although the context for the artistic ideal mentioned here was a discussion primarily 
concerning visual arts – in which expectations with regards to intelligibility and meaning are 
arguably lower than in literature – I shall argue that there are vivid traces of that ideal present 
also in Beckett‟s own work. Through presenting here a thorough explication of Beckett‟s 
statement, this introduction shall clarify what it is that I aim for, what I aim to say, with and in 
this thesis. Let it be understood right away that my main emphasis – as indeed suggested by 
use of italics in the above citation – will be on the notion of desire, and in relation to this, on 
the proposed obligation to express. 
Before treating the quote as such, the term „express‟ must be more precisely situated 
within this discourse. Preminger and Brogan cite an 18
th
 century source on literary expression 
which claims that ”[f]rom a literary point of view, [expression] is considered the 
representation of a thought” (Preminger and Brogan: 396). For my initial treatment of 
Beckett‟s quote, I shall stay close to a relatively uncontroversial definition of „expression‟, 
such as the one above. That is to say, I shall treat expression mainly as a linguistic or 
symbolic representation of a thought, feeling, intention, etc., while not ruling out discussion 
of other relevant definitions. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that Preminger and Brogan‟s 
source later claims that “the poet or orator who has beautiful ideas and no power of 
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expressing them is doomed to fail” (Preminger and Brogan: 396). Furthermore, Louis 
Hjelmslev‟s model of definition states that an “expressionless content or a contentless 
[expression] are both impossible” (Preminger and Brogan: 398). Both the doomed failure and 
the contentless – empty – expression are related to inexpression, or the expression of lack, 
which I shall discuss more at length later in this introduction. 
As for Beckett‟s artistic ideal, I refer to it as blatantly paradoxical not only because it 
negates itself; it also appears to (partly) oppose „common sense‟ – provided one can accept 
such a term in the first place. An expression that there is nothing to express appears to  negate 
itself, but not necessarily common sense. Judging by common sense, the expression that 
“there is nothing to express” seems fairly uncontroversial in a context where one feels that 
there is nothing to say. Yet it contradicts itself in the simple truth that, if nothing else, there is 
something to express in the form of that exact expression: “there is nothing to express”. 
Moreover, as a statement about art, more specifically about literature, the phrase expresses 
something else: that art is not dependent upon meaning; that art can meaningfully exist 
independently of an inherent meaning; that expression of something – of meaningful content – 
is not a prerequisite for artistic expression. Thus what Beckett claims here is a liberation of art 
from meaning; from «doing a little better the same old thing» (Beckett 1965: 103); ultimately, 
from the reduction of art to simple expression. 
Moving on, we encounter the two interrelated claims that there is “nothing with which 
to express [and] nothing from which to express”. Not only contradicting itself, this claim also 
challenges a commonsensical view on expression, on expressing; the words with which to 
express are right there, yet he uses them to express that they are not „there‟, even that they are 
not, that there is no(-such-)thing. Intuitively, this seems to be false; he must be saying 
something else – or something more. We might want to re-call, to call upon again, the 
previous claim: there is nothing to express. Common sense may suggest that we use words to 
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express something. But there is nothing with which to express that there is nothing to express. 
We may use words to utter the phrase “there is nothing to express”, but following the inherent 
paradox in that phrase, we will then have expressed. It is the uttering of the phrase which 
creates that paradox. If there is nothing to express, then we cannot use that expression – nor 
any other. There is nothing with which to express that there is nothing to express. 
With his first claim, Beckett liberated art from meaning. However, with this second 
claim, it appears that meaning has caught up again – that he is again caught up with meaning. 
If there is indeed nothing with which to express (that there is nothing to express), then the 
mentioned liberation of art appears impossible, unattainable. Just as the phrase “there is 
nothing to express” effaces its own meaning through its utterance, so does the attempt at 
artistic expression free of meaning annihilate its own goal – through being artistic, through 
being expression, but most importantly through having a goal, an intention, a meaning. 
Beckett appears, then, to wish for art to express the impossibility of its own liberation from 
meaning. 
Approaching the end of the quote, we find that there is also “no power to express.” 
Reading „power‟ as equivalent to „strength‟ or „force‟, we may see this as an act of 
surrendering to the impossibility at hand, which serves more than anything as a way of 
emphasizing what has already been expressed – as if to underline the lack, the impossibility of 
it all. However, we might read into it a different type of power, one which hints at the inner 
workings of language in a more abstract sense. Through admitting a lack of power to express, 
Beckett implies a lack of power over language as a whole. If there is no power to express, it is 
such because we – as users of language – cannot pin down a linguistic expression to mean (or 
not mean) exactly one precise meaning. Beyond the social conventions which constitute our 
everyday understanding of language, we have no governing power over language. Here, yet 
again, Beckett performs an act of liberation: language is not a slave of the user – the user is a 
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slave of language. We are all always at risk of misunderstanding, of being misunderstood, of 
creating ambiguities in and through our use of language. As such, before moving on to 
perhaps the most important part of Beckett‟s statement, I shall here make an attempt at 
paraphrasing what has been made out of the statement so far: there is nothing with which to 
express that there is nothing to express, because language will not allow it. 
I have so far only briefly mentioned the term „desire‟. The simple reason is that for 
this thesis, „desire‟ is too important a concept to touch upon without a proper introduction. 
Furthermore, precisely because it is such an important term, I shall defiantly refrain from 
trying to answer the question of what exactly desire is. In fact, I shall defiantly refrain from 
assuming that desire necessarily is anything, in the sense that it can be nailed down by use of 
other words. Like Peter Brooks, I too claim to be aware “that „desire‟ is a concept too broad, 
too fundamental, almost too banal to be defined” (Brooks: 37). Rather I shall attempt to 
expose the primary texts to close readings which intend to bring out the expression of desire – 
or, in the words of Brooks, I shall try to “say something about the forms that [desire] takes in 
narrative, how it represents itself, the dynamic it generates” (37). I say “the expression” not 
because there is only one expression or one way to express desire, but because I refer to 
expression in a general sense – perhaps in somewhat the same sense as Beckett himself, when 
he approaches the end of his quote by bringing in a lack of desire to express. 
I claim that I shall not try to define „desire‟, yet it seems irresponsible to avoid 
discussion of the term altogether. Therefore, with the help of Jacques Lacan, I shall try to 
clarify not what desire is, but rather how it is. Lacan constructs a triad consisting of need, 
demand and desire, which can be briefly summed up as follows: „need‟ stands for the basic, 
biological urge for that which keeps us alive – food, warmth, human touch; „demand‟ stands 
for the linguistic articulation of this need, the act of expressing it; „desire‟, finally, comes to 
be as a result of the inexpressible in need having passed through the expression of demand. In 
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Écrits, Lacan articulates it as follows: “...in so far as [man‟s] needs are subjected to demand, 
they return to him alienated. [...] That which is thus alienated in needs constitutes [...] an 
inability, it is supposed, to be articulated in demand, but it re-appears in something it gives 
rise to that presents itself in man as desire.” (316-17) Paraphrasing Lacan does seem 
somewhat risky, but in simpler words, I read this quote as follows: need is expressed through 
demand, but with the fulfilment of need follows a sense of dissatisfaction, a sense of lack. 
Desire shows itself here as a question unasked as well as unanswered for; it cannot be 
expressed and it cannot be fulfilled. Rather, desire comes to pass as inexpression, it takes up 
the place of that precise lack in expression which itself constitutes desire. 
Having expressly stated that I shall not explicitly define „desire‟, it may seem 
contradictory that I shall shortly refer to a definition suggested by OED. However, I bring this 
in not for definitional purposes, but rather to demonstrate an important aspect in Beckett‟s 
quote, namely the constant and, yet again, somewhat paradoxical presence of lack. As I have 
tried to demonstrate above, this presence of lack is not equivalent to an absence; that is to say, 
it is not so much a matter of something‟s lack of presence, but rather the strange presence 
which is constituted by that lack of presence. Analogically speaking, it is the (amputated) 
limb in which the wounded may experience sensations of phantom pain. As such, what is 
present in the phrase “no desire to express” is the lack of desire. The notion of lack is also 
implied in OED‟s suggestion that desire may be “a longing, properly for a thing once 
possessed and now missed; a sense of loss.”2 If we assume that desire has its origin in the lack 
of that which desire is directed at, we may read “no desire to express” – in other words, the 
stated lack of desire to express – as the paradoxical expression of that exact desire. “The 
                                                             
2
  ‘desire’, Oxford English Dictionary, 23 Sep. 2009: 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50061838?query_type=word&queryword=desire&first=1&max_to_show
=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2> 
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expression that there is [...] no desire to express” thus may present us with, as I have claimed 
above, the desire to inexpress. 
I shall get back to the notion of inexpression momentarily, with regards to the very 
final phrase in Beckett‟s quote, about the obligation to express. At present, however, I shall 
try to explain what it is I aim to do in the main chapters of this thesis, and how it ties up with 
the quote I have been explicating in this introduction. The texts to be discussed are short 
stories or short prose texts, all written by Samuel Beckett, in which I see different forms of 
desire as assuming important roles in the expression of the texts. That is to say, in all of these 
texts there is a presence which is constituted through an absence, a lack. This presence, I shall 
argue, is that of desire, and it is my intention to reveal the expression of this presence – how 
the various desires come to surface; how they are expressed by the characters and the narrator, 
as well as by the author; and what constitutes the absence that desire feeds on. 
The obligation to express concludes Beckett‟s statement about artistic expression, and 
it is the only part of the sentence in which there is a stated presence rather than an absence. 
The obligation to express is there, as a force, in the artistic expression – in fact, there is 
nothing but obligation; everything else is characterised by its absence. Thus follows the 
question “what do you do when „I can‟t‟ meets „I must‟?” (Harvey in Casanova: 85). In a 
typically Beckettian paradox, impossibility of expression meets obligation – the sum of 
which, as I shall argue, is inexpression. As for obligation, it can be read to mean a 
requirement; the artist is required to express by nature of being an artist. Furthermore, the 
artist may be obliged, in the intransitive meaning which may suggest gratitude, being 
indebted, to art. The artist brings upon him- or herself the requirement to repay his or her debt 
to art by artistic expression. However, expression has already been denied by Beckett. The 
artist Samuel Beckett is indebted, required, to express. But there is no expression, no means 
for expression – there is only obligation. Thus the notion of „inexpression‟, a term classified 
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by OED as a nonce word; it was used once by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in a letter, about his 
own face, to express “Want or absence of expression”3. My use of it shall be to refer to that 
form of expression which Beckett appears to aim at with his claim: the expression of the lack 
which constitutes desire, the signifier for the present absence, the nothing which actively takes 
up the space of something. Derrida says about the trace that it “is not a presence but is rather 
the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself. The trace 
has, properly speaking, no place, for effacement belongs to the very structure of the trace” 
(Derrida 1973: 156). My use of the term inexpression is similar, yet different. Rather than 
referring to an absence which is similar to presence, I direct my attention towards the absence 
in its own right, as something which has a presence. 
The texts in question are the three early prose texts “First Love,” “The End” and 
“Texts for Nothing”. With regards to the latter text I intend to pay slightly more attention to 
desires directly related to expression in itself; the artistic expression as such will be central to 
my reading, more so than with the first two. Discussion of the two former texts will focus 
more on the plot and the actions of the characters, and how their desires are expressed through 
the voice of the narrator. The reason for this choice, I shall argue, is a difference in 
expression, in the specific use of language to relate the stories: “First Love” and “The End” 
are more focused on displaying a story with recognisable characters, with beginning and end, 
with a plot that, more or less, moves forward. “Texts for Nothing” to a greater degree centres 
its narration around stylistic aspects such as repetition and a more complex narrative, as well 
as mental or inner activity rather than physical or verbal action which often drive the plot of 
more traditional stories. 
                                                             
3
 ‘inexpression’, Oxford English Dictionary, 2 Nov. 2010: 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/findword?query_type=word&queryword=inexpression&find.x=0&find.y=0&fin
d=Find+word> 
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I mentioned the central role of desire in these texts, but that is not the only link 
between them. As we shall see, publication history connects at least three of the texts: “First 
Love”  was originally written in French in 1946, under the title “Premier amour”. The text 
was initially part of a planned collection of short stories called Quatre nouvelles. However, 
because some of his earlier works were accepted by a small Parisian publishing house called 
Minuit, Beckett chose to put the publishing of Quatre nouvelles on hold. As such, “First 
Love” was not published until 1970, then as a stand-alone text, followed by an English 
translation in 1973. This first publication of the story happened to some extent against 
Beckett‟s own will, as he felt forced to publish something relatively quickly after having 
received the Nobel Prize in 1969 (Ackerley & Gontarski: 197, 372, 454, 473). Part of the 
planned Quatre nouvelles was also “La Fin”4, which was written in 1946 and later translated 
into English as “The End”. The English translation was first published in the Paris-based 
English magazine Merlin in 1954, and later most notably – at least for the purposes of this 
thesis – in a collection titled Stories and Texts for Nothing, by Grove Press in 1967 (ibid. 172, 
195, 369). As the title suggests, this collection also included “Texts for Nothing”, which were 
originally written in French in 1951 as “Textes pour rien”. Various selections of the English 
translation were published in different literary magazines from the late 1950s, until all thirteen 
texts were compiled and published as one collection in 1967, both in No’s Knife and in the 
above-mentioned Stories and Texts for Nothing (ibid. 560-61). 
In addition to stating my intentions and giving some background information, I have 
attempted, with this introductory chapter, to make a meta-point of sorts. My reading of 
Beckett‟s statement on artistic ideal is both theoretically and methodically similar to what I 
will aim at with the forthcoming readings of the primary texts. That is to say that my approach 
                                                             
4 An earlier version of this text was called ”Suite”. There was also a version of the text in two parts, “Suite et 
fin”, of which the first was published in a literary journal, by Simone de Beauvoir. The second part was, to 
Beckett’s dismay, refused by Beauvoir (ibid. 547). I shall discuss the importance of these alternative titles in the 
second chapter. 
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will largely be one of close reading, with the application of mainly psychoanalytical and post-
structural concepts in accordance with the points that my readings bring forth. The reasoning 
behind this choice is first and foremost grounded in the impression that so-called applied 
theory – that is, trying to read a text in accordance with a particular set of ideas and concepts, 
or a specific „school‟ – is bound to upset the independent and individual reading that I intend 
it to be. That is to not say, of course, that „anything goes‟ as long as it makes sense to me and 
is in accordance with my reading. Rather, one may consider this an evasive choice of sorts: 
unable to stay true to the ideas of one particular branch of literary theory, I choose a mix-and-
match approach – only leaning slightly towards the postmodernist tendency towards a 
fragmentary reading.  
It is worth noting that such a tendency may serve to privilege the details and 
peculiarities of singular passages over an overarching sense of progress, over the totality of 
the bigger picture. I call this a postmodernist tendency in accordance with Jean-Francois 
Lyotard‟s definition of postmodernism: In “Defining the Postmodern” he observes a “sort of 
decay in the confidence placed [...] in the idea of progress” (1613). Furthermore, Leitch 
claims that Lyotard “urged his readers to „wage a war on totality‟ and to critique „grand 
narratives‟ that purport to explain everything” (Leitch: 1032). It follows from this that I shall 
not make an attempt to „explain‟ Beckett in terms of a totality or progress that I claim to see in 
his works. Rather, I shall try to uncover and bring out the expressions and passages that I 
deem of interest to the issue at hand – desire and language – and examine possible 
connections within and between these expressions. 
Historically, the birth of the method that is generally termed „close reading‟ is 
attributed to the school of New Criticism. This branch of literary theory is typically branded a 
formalist theory, because of its nearly exclusive focus on literary form, on the qualities that 
are inherent in the text; contextual, historical and intentional issues were of little interest for 
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the New Critical school. Terry Eagleton, in Literary Theory: An Introduction, claims that to 
call for close reading is: 
to do more than insist on due attentiveness to the text. It inescapably suggests an attention to this rather 
than to something else: to the „words on the page‟ rather than to the contexts which produced and 
surround them. [Close reading] was the beginnings of a „reification‟ of the literary work, the treatment 
of it as an object in itself, which was to be triumphantly consummated in the American New Criticism. 
(44)  
W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley listed five „axiomatic‟ propositions in their seminal 
article “The Intentional Fallacy”. These axioms, briefly paraphrased, will here serve as a short 
summary of the main principles of New Criticism: 1. Although the author can be regarded as 
the 'cause' of the poem, the author's intention cannot be regarded as the standard by which to 
judge the poem. 2. If the author is successful in what he or she intended, the intention is 
readily available in the poem itself. If the author is unsuccessful, we must go outside the poem 
to find the intention. 3. A poem is treated all at once, as one complex of meaning; there is not 
an irrelevant part in a successful poem. 4. The thoughts and feelings of a poem are ascribed to 
the dramatic speaker rather than to the author. 5. A revised poem may better express the 
original intention than the original poem. However, the original intention cannot have been 
the intention when producing the revised poem.  
Although close reading as a method of interpretation has its origin in the New Critical 
branch of theory, it is not set in stone that the performance, as it were, of a close reading must 
necessarily stay true to the axioms of New Criticism. As mentioned above, I shall rather turn 
to aspects of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism where my readings suggest that these may 
serve to clarify my points. Any such use of theoretical concepts or ideas will be properly 
introduced and explained in relation with the passage to which it is applied, and as such I will 
not go into further detail on these concepts at present. 
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2. The intolerable encounter: “First Love” 
„Love,‟ to the narrator of “First Love,” is more than anything a word. He has heard of it – “at 
home, in school, in brothel and at church” (34) – even read books about it; in short, he is 
aware of its existence, even its „appearance‟, but he has never experienced it. In A Lover’s 
Discourse: Fragments, Roland Barthes writes about love that “[t]here occurs an encounter 
which is intolerable, on account of the joy within it, and [...] man is thereby reduced to 
nothing” (Barthes 1990: 55). Interestingly, this statement may plausibly be read as a 
somewhat crude summary of the plot in “First Love”. Intolerable joy shall be a central theme 
of my reading, and as such it is important to understand the close connection between this 
intolerability and the notion of desire. Jacques Lacan uses the term „jouissance‟5 to refer to the 
desire to “transgress the prohibitions imposed on [...] enjoyment, to go „beyond the pleasure 
principle‟” (Evans: 91-2). „Jouissance‟ is the domain which lies beyond the limits of 
enjoyment, and as such „jouissance‟ is also pain – because, as desires go, it cannot be 
satisfied. The intolerable part of the joy is precisely that part of it which constitutes desire, 
that part in which is grounded the desire to surpass possibility of attainment. In this chapter I 
shall explore in particular the problematic roles of Lulu and the dead father in Beckett‟s story, 
the importance of space, and the narrator‟s troubles with love and expression. I intend to show 
how the intolerable in joy is expressed through language; how the narrator‟s desires are 
exposed through a lack of expression; how the intolerable in joy is also the impossible of 
desire. 
“There occurs an encounter,” states Barthes; however, in this story there are two 
important encounters, both intolerable in their own way. The story sets off by connecting the 
two encounters: “I associate, rightly or wrongly, my marriage with the death of my father, in 
time. That other links exist, on other levels, between these two affairs, is not impossible” 
                                                             
5 ’Jouissance’ is derived from ’joir’ – an Old French word meaning ’to enjoy’. 
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(Beckett 1995: 25). The first encounter, then, is with the death of the father; the second is with 
a woman, specifically with Lulu, a prostitute. In her article “The Father, Love, and 
Banishment”, Julia Kristeva sees Lulu as a substitute for the protection previously provided 
by the father. Love, she claims, “finally appears in reality under the guise of a paternal 
corpse” (Kristeva: 249), thus creating a strong connection between love and biological matter. 
This connection is reinforced by the narrator, through his “inscribing the letters of Lulu in an 
old heifer pat or flat on [his] face in the mud under the moon trying to tear up the nettles by 
the roots” (Beckett 1995: 34). Lacking a proper understanding of what love is, connecting it 
thus to something tangible, something material, may represent a way for the narrator to make 
it easier to relate to what he perceives to be a strange and unfamiliar feeling. 
The connection between love and biological waste – most prominently, faeces and 
dead bodies – is a recurring one in “First Love”. Early on in the story, before his eviction, the 
narrator is troubled by constipation. He is so troubled, in fact, that his relatives in the house 
have the time they need to empty his room while he is doing his business, so to speak – or at 
least trying to: “One day, on my return from stool, I found my room locked and my 
belongings in a heap before the door. This will give you some idea of how constipated I was, 
at this juncture” (28). Biological waste is brought up even earlier in the story, when the 
narrator visits the father‟s graveyard: 
Personally I have no bone to pick with graveyards, I take the air there willingly, perhaps more willingly 
than elsewhere, when take air I must. The smell of corpses, distinctly perceptible under those of grass 
and humus mingled, I do not find unpleasant, a trifle on the sweet side perhaps, a trifle heady, but how 
infinitely preferable to what the living emit, their feet, teeth, armpits, arses, sticky foreskins and 
frustrated ovules. And when my father‟s remains join in, however modestly, I can almost shed a tear. 
(25-6) 
Here, a subversion occurs of the typical relationship between living and dead: the narrator 
admits to feeling more comfortable among the dead than among the living. It is from the latter 
that the foul smell of waste is emitted, whereas the dead fade into their natural surroundings 
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with minimal resistance. Central in the passage above is also the nearly-shed tear: finally the 
narrator can come close to feeling something, some kind of love, for his father in death – or 
rather, for his biological remains. The act of writing Lulu‟s name in cow manure may work 
similarly to the nearly-shed tear: through „projecting‟ Lulu – represented here only by name, 
the only part of her that he, through his act of renaming, can possess – onto waste-matter, he 
can objectify his feelings, he can make the dreaded „love‟ into something material. As such, 
biological waste turns into a means to express desire. 
The fatherly protection that Kristeva brings up, is first constituted in the form of a 
room in the father‟s house – a room from which the narrator, soon after the father‟s death, is 
evicted by the remaining inhabitants of the house. A similar sense of protection is represented 
by Lulu, particularly when she takes him in and lets him stay in her parlour. Indeed, she even 
allows him to rearrange the room according to his liking: he quickly moves all the furniture, 
save a single couch, out into the corridor. Furthermore, their initial meeting place may 
represent a protective space: a bench, „walled in‟ on two sides by majestic trees, and on the 
rear side by a mound of dirt, at first serves the role of a room in its own right – a personal 
space, in the sense that it is reminiscent of the room from which the narrator was evicted. 
Soon, however, the space is invaded by Lulu, and is thus transformed into an image that 
represents her alone: “to speak of the bench, as it appeared to me at evening, is to speak of 
her, for me” (31-2). As such, the image of Lulu does indeed seem to represent a sense of 
protection. But is it the protection in itself that the narrator loves, or might there be something 
more to it? 
The first sentence of the story may yet again provide a hint: despite the narrator‟s use 
of the word „marriage‟, this is in no way a case of lawfully pronounced man and wife; rather, 
as the narrator suggests, it is “a kind of union in spite of all” (45). Lawful or not, however, 
there does seem to be a sense of affection between Lulu and the narrator – a sort of reciprocal 
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dependency or emotional attachment. His love for her is clearly enough expressed, although 
the focus appears to be more on the expression itself than on the feeling – or rather, perhaps, 
on the apparent disparity between the two. The expression – that is, the name „love‟ – is 
something that he can relate to, it is graspable because it is a mere word. The problem occurs 
with the realization that, although „love‟ is a word much like any other word, its referent love 
is not a feeling much like any other feeling. Love demands something from him – it demands 
expression, materialization. “Powerless to utter itself, powerless to speak, love nonetheless 
wants to proclaim itself, to exclaim, to write itself everywhere,” Barthes claims in A Lover’s 
Discourse (77-8). But there is nothing in the word „love‟ to make it stand out in the manner 
that the feeling does. This disparity between word and referent constitutes a sense of 
misrepresentation – as if love disconnects language from the world. It is for this reason that 
the narrator can relate to the word, to the name, but not to the feeling: “Yes, I loved her, it‟s 
the name I gave, still give alas, to what I was doing then” (34). Uncertain of how to relate to 
how he feels, but certain that the feeling must be materialized somehow, he tries to transform 
love by connecting it to  a set of rather concrete, and less complicated, actions: he writes 
Lulu‟s name in cow manure, he thinks of her for up to half an hour a day, he visits the bench 
in the hope that he will find her there again. By assigning his actions with the name „love‟, he 
betrays a desire to diminish the gap between signifier and signified, between language and the 
reality outside of language, that which language is an attempt to represent. Treating love as an 
action can be seen as an attempt to change the premises for expressing love: if it can be 
expressed through a simple act – if love can be simplified in the sense that it can be done – 
then he can claim the ability to do it, and the misrepresentation is, in a way, rectified. 
Upon one of his repeated visits to the bench, their mutual affection is expressed by 
both sides: “Is it on my account you came? I said. She managed yes to that. [...] And I? Had I 
not come on hers?” (36). Thus having confirmed that there exists a pronounced emotional 
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bond between them, one may pose the question of what constitutes this bond. I have already 
suggested that Lulu may represent a sense of protection, one that he has lost with the death of 
his father. When she first steps inside the space of the text, physically speaking, she catches 
him by surprise, and the only thing preventing him from standing up and walking away, is his 
fatigue (30). As an „alien‟, an invader of the narrator‟s private space, she hardly seems to 
represent a protective force. Her behaviour, however, appears to intrigue him: “All she had 
done was sing, beneath her breath as to herself, and without the words fortunately, some old 
folk songs, and so disjointedly, skipping from one to another and finishing none” (30). This 
act of singing is repeated later in the story, then on the narrator‟s own request: 
I asked her to sing me a song. I thought at first she was going to refuse, I mean simply not sing, but no, 
after a moment she began to sing and sang for some time, all the time the same song it seemed to me, 
without change of attitude. I did not know the song, I had never heard it before and shall never hear it 
again. (36-37) 
He then goes on to walk away while she is singing, all the while measuring the distance 
between them on the basis of the sound of her voice. When he can no longer hear it, he 
retraces his steps to know whether she has stopped singing or if he is merely too far away to 
hear. This is reminiscent, in many ways, of what Freud called the child‟s „fort-da‟ game. 
Madan Sarup describes the game as follows: 
Freud observed his eighteen-month-old grandson who had a cotton reel with a piece of string tied to it. 
Holding the string, he would throw the reel over the edge of his cot and utter sounds that Freud 
interpreted as being an attempt at the German „fort‟, meaning „gone‟ or „away‟. He would then pull the 
reel back into his field of vision, greeting its reappearance with a joyful „da‟ („there‟). [...] According to 
Freud the cotton reel was the child‟s symbol for his mother, and the „fort-da‟ game gave him the illusion 
of control over her (desirable) presence and (undesirable) absence. (68, 183) 
What is perhaps most interesting, and relevant, in this description, is the illusion of control 
that is achieved by the child, through it being in charge of the presence and absence of the 
desired object. The narrator here takes charge of presence and absence in much the same way, 
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through leaving the bench – in his mind, a representation of Lulu – and returning to find her 
there again. 
With regards to the narrator‟s feelings for Lulu, then, there appears to be hints of them 
being largely constituted by a sense of protection. As such, it might be fruitful to look closer 
at the narrator‟s use of the word „love‟: how does he perceive and articulate the feelings that 
he has for her? In the first explicit reference to love, he claims that “[w]hat goes by the name 
of love is banishment, with now and then a postcard from the homeland” (31). Directly 
preceding this quote, is a passage where he recollects having an erection caused by Lulu 
stroking his ankles – an episode which seems to „banish‟ him from his self: “One is no longer 
oneself, on such occasions, and it is painful to be no longer oneself, even more painful if 
possible than when one is.” As mentioned above, love is demanding, it demands to be 
expressed. The narrator‟s difficulties with expressing it seems to make that demand even 
stronger, to the extent that it turns into an intrusion, an interruption of his being. Love 
becomes something that forcefully pulls him out of his normal state of being preoccupied only 
with his own self – it forces him not only to care for an Other, but to realise that the Other is 
similar to himself: “the way she kept on saying, I don‟t know, I can‟t. I alone did not know 
and could not” (36). The impression of love being an unwelcome feeling is soon solidified 
when the narrator realizes that “for the first time in my life, and I would not hesitate to say the 
last if I had not to husband my cyanide, I had to contend with a feeling which gradually 
assumed, to my dismay, the dread name of love” (33). The image of „husbanding his cyanide‟ 
brings together two quite different connotations, namely marriage and suicide. It seems here 
as if the narrator sees his relationship with Lulu to be comparable to a drawn-out suicidal 
process, a downwards spiral headed towards his own destruction. 
So far, then, the intolerable in the encounter with Lulu seems clear enough: her 
presence, whether in person or in his thoughts, interferes with the narrator‟s sense of self. He 
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feels as if he is banished from his self. But there must be some sense of pleasure here as well 
– after all, his revisiting the bench in the hope to find her there may be regarded as a sort of 
pursuit. If the encounter is intolerable, because of the feelings it induces, then why does he 
seek it? Now, the realisation that he is in love appears to be a consequence of not seeing her, 
thus a consequence of absence. In her absence, he is caught up in thoughts about her 
(presence), thus he must seek her presence. When he is with her, he is “at least free to think of 
something else than her, of the old trusty things, and so little by little, as down steps towards a 
deep, of nothing” (39). This act of thinking of nothing seems to represent an end in its own 
right, when he claims that “[w]hat mattered to me in my dispeopled kingdom [...] was 
supineness in the mind, the dulling of the self” (31). Considering this mental passivity to be a 
goal for him, we consequently encounter the possibility that the narrator‟s wish for Lulu‟s 
company is no more than a means to an end – a way of pacifying the mind which is otherwise 
brimming with activity on account of Lulu‟s absence. 
Returning now to Barthes, he claims that absence “can exist only as a consequence of 
the other: it is the other who leaves, it is I who remain” (13). Given that Lulu represents the 
other, it seems natural to consider her the absent one in the story. However, the absence-
presence relation is here subverted: the narrator is the absent one, he is the one who leaves. 
Three times he abandons her: first in the form of no longer coming to the bench at night, even 
if it is “less [...] on her account than on its” (Beckett 1995: 33), as he claims. The second time 
he leaves is after having returned to the bench “to try and put an end, to this plight” (35), that 
is to say, to seek her presence in order to pacify the mind. This is when he asks her to sing 
him a song, and he plays with the sound of her voice. The very last lines of the story tells of 
his third act of leaving, in a fashion similar to the previous one. He wakes up one night to hear 
crying from the room next to his parlour – either from Lulu giving birth or from the newborn 
baby – and, finding the situation unbearable, the narrator leaves: 
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I began playing with the cries, a little in the same way as I had played with the song, on, back, on, back, 
if that may be called playing. As long as I kept walking I didn‟t hear them, because of the footsteps. But 
as soon as I halted I heard them again, a little fainter each time, admittedly, but what does it matter, 
faint or loud, cry is cry, all that matters is that it should cease. For years I thought they would cease. 
Now I don‟t think so any more. I could have done with other loves perhaps. But there it is, either you 
love or you don‟t. (45) 
In all three of these scenes, Barthes‟ presence-absence relation is overturned: the actions of 
the “I” create a sense of absence, while the one to remain is the other. Thus speaking of 
Lulu‟s absence might be misdirected; rather, it appears as if her presence is constant – she is 
always there, be it in his mind when he is absent, right by his side when he is asleep, or even 
through her and the baby‟s cries after he leaves her for good. 
It appears, then, that in the relationship between Lulu and the narrator, the latter is the 
absent one. There is a potentially intriguing connection here, to the above-mentioned 
banishment: because he is in love with Lulu, he is banished – he is forced to become the 
other, to leave his self. As such, if he is to return to his own self, he is forced to leave Lulu; no 
matter what he does, he is bound to be the absent one, to be the other. However, there is also a 
different absence in this story, namely that of the father. In this relationship, the father is the 
other – the one who leaves, as it were – whereas the narrator remains. The father‟s physical 
being within the story amounts to little more than a remote and “far too small” yard on the 
side of a hill (27). Paradoxically, it is precisely his absence which determines his presence – 
his absence is the one part of him that demands to be present in the text, through the space 
that is left behind by his death, by his leaving. That is to say, it is the father‟s permanent 
absence which makes the text possible; his not being there constitutes a lack in the narrator 
which serves as a catalyst for the story. Throughout the story there are hints about the 
relationship between father and son, the father being not just a provider of space – an idea 
which will be discussed at more length further on in this chapter – but also of knowledge, of 
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guidance: it was he who taught the narrator the names of the lighthouses and lightships of the 
city, and showed him the constellations in the heavens (44-5). 
The role of the father deserves some more attention: the paternal function has an 
integral role to play in psychoanalysis. Here, it is interesting to note that Dylan Evans, in his 
An Introductory Dictionary to Lacanian Psychoanalysis, claims that “the symbolic father is 
also the dead father” (63), if only because it fills the role of the father in “First Love” with 
symbolic potential. I have claimed that the father here is, perhaps first and foremost, a 
provider of protection and space – a function which to some extent serves to feminize the 
father. There is a contrast, here, to psychoanalysis: the paternal function, according to Lacan, 
is to be the provider of Law – that is to say, “he is the representative of the social order” 
(Evans: 62), and the regulator of desire. The providing space and protection are typically 
more feminine properties in psychoanalytical schemas. Thus it seems that the father here has a 
potentially problematic role, and one which may appear to overlap with that of Lulu. I shall 
come back to the notion of space further on in this chapter.   
As for the relation between father and son, the title of the story may provide some 
guidance here: for whom is the first love felt? Given that the first love is also the only one in 
the story, the answer to this question may lead to some interesting inferences. If Lulu is the 
object of his first love – which would appear to be the case – we may infer that the father was 
not an object of love. Alternatively, his feelings for Lulu may be the result of transference: 
redirection of the possibly retained feelings for the father, turning now towards an object able 
and willing to receive. Kristeva argues for a similar point, claiming also that the mentioned 
banishment in love is integral with regards to the narrator‟s ability – or lack thereof – to 
realize his feelings. She presents two aspects or types of banishment, one for each of the two 
intolerable encounters. The first banishment, related to the father, is “an attempt at separating 
oneself from the august and placid expanses where the father‟s sublime Death, and thus 
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Meaning, merges with the son‟s self” (Kristeva 1980: 249-50; emphasis original). The second, 
now with regards to Lulu, is “above/beyond a life of love. A life always off to one side, at an 
impassable distance, mourning a love. A fragile, uncertain life, where [...] he discovers the 
price of warmth [...] and the boredom of those humans who provide it – but who waste it, too” 
(250). 
The two intolerable encounters, with the father‟s death and with Lulu, together set the 
premises, create a frame of sorts, for the story: the encounter with the death of the father sets 
the story off through culminating in the first banishment, that is leaving the father‟s premises 
behind. Throughout the encounter with Lulu – from when they first meet, until he finally 
departs – he stays at an “impassable distance” through his repeated acts of leaving and coming 
back to see her again. As mentioned above, this brings forth a similarity to Freud‟s notion of 
the child‟s „fort-da‟ game, giving the narrator the illusion of control over Lulu‟s presence and 
absence. When the affair with Lulu later culminates with her pregnancy, followed by the birth 
of his child, a third intolerable encounter comes to pass – this time intolerable to the extent 
that he must resort to a third and absolute banishment. There occurs a kind of junction 
between life and death, constituted here by the child and the father respectively, which bears 
some resemblance to an observation made by Kristeva in Powers of Horror, regarding the 
famous case of Dr. Ignaz Semmelweis: 
Semmelweis noted [...] that puerperal fever is the result of the female genitalia being contaminated by a 
corpse; here then is a fever where what bears life passes over to the side of the dead body. Distracting 
moment when opposites (life/death, feminine/masculine) join in order to constitute what is probably 
more than a defense against the persecuting power of the mother: a panic hallucination of death 
following the abolishment of limits and differences. The remedy? – Once more it involves separating, 
not touching, dividing. (Kristeva 1982: 159-60) 
The pronounced association between the dead father and the “marriage” with Lulu – not only 
associated in time, but also possibly by “other links [...], on other levels” (Beckett 1997:25) – 
appears to be intolerable with regards to the birth of what Lulu claims is his child; by the 
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extension that is the narrator himself, the child is contaminated by the father‟s body, and the 
narrator‟s complete absence is the only remedy. Kristeva appears to see banishment not only 
as an event, but also as a type of action. The seemingly sub- or unconscious act is necessary in 
order for the narrator to free himself from the death of the father – and to free his child as 
well: “without banishment, there is no possible release from the grip of paternal Death” 
(Kristeva 1980: 250). 
The banishment from the dead father thus comes to reflect Lacan‟s mirror stage for the 
narrator – the point where the child takes its first and perhaps most important steps towards 
becoming an individual, through recognizing itself in the mirror as a self-governing and 
individual body, distinct from that of its mother. 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation – and 
which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of 
phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic – and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark 
with its rigid structure the subject‟s entire mental development. (Lacan: 5; emphasis added) 
It is important here to note that Lacan considers the child to be unfinished and under 
construction, so to speak – that “the human child‟s resources at birth are insufficient for its 
needs” (Sarup: 64). With the mirror stage, the child anticipates the shape of a future, 
autonomous self; it constitutes the structure for this self. Thus, without this „orthopaedic 
totality‟ there is no proper support for the self – it collapses. “To love is to survive paternal 
meaning,” claims Kristeva (250). In other words, the construction of the narrator‟s self must 
avoid collapse when the part of that construction constituted by the father, is taken away. Lulu 
may thus be read as the object of an unconscious transference of love, a substitution of the 
dead father, for an object with similar properties. With regards to the unconscious, I have 
already introduced Lacan‟s notion of the subject‟s dependence upon the Other. If we apply 
this dependence to the narrator‟s relationship to his father, a lack of being, a lack in the self, 
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comes to surface in the narrator. Considering, with Lacan, the human subject as a construction 
rather than as a natural whole, one may argue that the narrator represents an incomplete 
construction. 
An important part of this construction of the narrator‟s self, appears to pertain to 
space. Through the death of the father, the narrator loses the space with which the father 
provided him: his own room in the father‟s house. Thus a part of his self is lost. Following the 
intolerable encounter with the father‟s death, he must embark on a quest to recover the lost 
space. However, space in itself is not sufficient to fulfil his needs; the organisation of space 
appears to carry some significance, as well. This is first hinted at when he accounts for his 
relation to graveyards, stating that “my father‟s yard was not amongst my favourites. [...] I 
infinitely preferred Ohlsdorf [...] with its nine hundred acres of corpses packed tight” (27). 
The same organisational preference is apparent when Lulu shows him her parlour; by moving 
all furniture, apart from the couch he is to sleep on, out into the corridor, he organises the 
available space. He appears to think of furniture as needless ornamentation – a waste of space. 
In relation with the desired „supineness of the mind‟, he speaks also of “the execrable frippery 
known as the non-self and even the world, for short” (31). Judging by this, he seems to see the 
majority of the world around him as wasted space; in Lulu‟s parlour he is simply given an 
opportunity to arrange the „world‟ – here in the form of an enclosed space within four walls – 
according to his liking. 
There appears to be an appeal, to the narrator, in the idea of delimited or organized 
space. In two important parts of the story, he finds himself in a space surrounded by only 
three „walls‟ – which, in both cases, leaves him open and vulnerable. He is first forced to get 
dressed in a “narrow space, guarded on three sides only,” (29) outside of his room in the 
father‟s house, after he is evicted. Even though this part of the story is cut rather short by the 
narrator, it certainly carries some weight: the eviction in a way serves as a catalyst for the rest 
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of the story, as he is forced out of the safe habitat of the house, out into the world – it is the 
first banishment. It also serves to illustrate the relationship between the narrator and the rest 
of the people residing in the house. While the narrator is busy in the bathroom, struggling 
with constipation, „they‟ take action and put all his belongings in a heap outside the door of 
his room. Having no choice, he leaves the house and finds the bench, which he also describes 
as being walled in on three sides. This can perhaps be considered in connection with the 
image of him as an incomplete structure; a room with three walls may also be seen as 
incomplete. 
It is perhaps mainly because of Lulu‟s little invasion of the bench that it seems feasible 
to consider this space a vulnerable one for the narrator; in fact, he himself initially refers to 
this space in positive terms: 
It was a well situated bench, backed by a mound of solid earth and garbage, so that my rear was 
covered. My flanks too, partially, thanks to a pair of venerable trees, dead, at either end of the bench. 
[...] To the fore, a few yards away, flowed the canal, if canals flow, don‟t ask me, so that from that 
quarter too the risk of surprise was small. (30) 
As homely and secure as he makes this space sound, it is perhaps exactly the safety of the 
bench that makes him relaxed enough to let Lulu in, to let her take part in that space. Her 
presence fills in, one might say, for the lacking fourth wall, and she thus comes to provide a 
completely enclosed space for the narrator. 
In order to develop further on the idea of Lulu as provider of space, I shall explore the 
term khôra in some detail: the term stems from ancient Greek philosophy, specifically the 
dialogues of Plato. John D. Caputo explains the khôra precisely as a sort of provider of space: 
Khôra is the immense and indeterminable spatial receptacle [...] providing a “home” for all things. 
Khôra is neither an intelligible form nor one more sensible thing, but, rather, that in which (in quo) 
sensible things are inscribed [...]. This receptacle is like the forms inasmuch as it has a kind of eternity: 
[...] it is always already there, [it has] a certain a-chronistic a-temporality. (1997a: 84; emphasis 
original) 
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Moreover, Caputo claims, khôra is “neither present nor absent, active nor passive, the Good 
nor evil, living nor nonliving” (1997b; 35-6). Derrida goes even further, in On the Name, 
when he claims that we “cannot even say of it that it is neither this nor that or that it is both 
this and that. It is not enough to recall that khôra names neither this nor that, or, that khôra 
says this and that” (1995: 89; emphasis original). What seems evident from these two quotes 
is perhaps primarily that khôra is unrepresentable. As such, a possible reading of Lulu as a 
representation of khôra leaves us with an intriguing paradox: she is a representation of the 
unrepresentable. 
I have already presented as plausible the idea of Lulu as a protective force in her 
relation to the narrator. The possible reading of her as representing khôra is, in fact, not a far 
stretch from that. Being a prostitute, she can certainly be said to provide some kind of space: 
through her occupation, perhaps mainly a space for sexuality and the space that results from 
the prostitute being a form of escapism for customers. With regards to her relationship to the 
narrator, I have mentioned how she may be read to take the place of the lacking fourth wall: 
she completes the protective barriers that he requires to be comfortable. This is evident, at 
first, when the narrator explains that “to speak of the bench, as it appeared to me at evening, is 
to speak of her, for me” (31-2). Initially, she was an invader of that exact space, whereas here 
it seems as if she has come to stand, to him, rather as the main provider of it. The homely 
space of the bench comes to seem almost analogous to a womb, and the narrator‟s love for 
Lulu becomes reminiscent to the Freud‟s concept of the death drive: according to Robert 
Hinshelwood, this concept can briefly be described as “a deathly wish to return to a state of 
disintegration, the silence of the grave” (135). Given that Lulu‟s presence now has 
„transformed‟ the bench to a womb-like space – and considering also the narrator‟s „fort-da‟ 
game with that space – his act of repeatedly returning to the bench appears to be constituted 
by a desire to return to the prenatal unity with the mother. Hinshelwood‟s mentioning of the 
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grave is also interesting with regards to the narrator‟s visits to the graveyard earlier in the 
story: feeling, as he has admitted earlier, more at home there among the dead, than among the 
living, also appears to betray a wish for that calm and lack of being which comes with death. 
Lulu‟s role as space provider becomes even more concrete when she takes him in, and 
lets him stay in the parlour of her apartment. A problem occurs, however, when she proceeds 
to transgress the protective barriers: she takes up the space that she has provided for him, 
through sleeping with him – and even worse, she becomes pregnant with his child. His desire 
for the womb again seems obvious in the passage where she presents her pregnancy to him: 
“She had drawn back the curtain for a clear view of all her rotundities. I saw the mountain, 
impassible, cavernous, secret, [...] all warmth and scent” (44). Rather than seeing the actual 
mother and the child that she bears, he sees past her, to the analogical womb of the caves of 
the mountain, paired with the memories of his father teaching him the names of lighthouses 
and lightships, all visible from said mountain. “From that day forth things went from bad to 
worse, to worse and worse,” he relates (44); there is no space for him anymore. I have cited 
above Kristeva‟s claim, that “to love is to survive paternal meaning”. The space – physical as 
well as analogical – that Lulu has provided, has allowed the narrator to survive the lack of the 
provider that was the father. That space, or at least a significant part of it, is now permanently 
taken up by another being. 
In relation to the reading of Lulu as a representation of the khôra, I briefly mentioned 
the paradox that this entails: she is a representation of the unrepresentable. The narrator 
appears to have a similar understanding with regards to the expression of love: to him, love 
demands expression, yet it seems inexpressible. This is related to Beckett‟s desire for his own 
use of language, his own art: according to my reading of Beckett in his dialogue with Georges 
Duthuit, Beckett sees art as a slave of meaning; he wishes for his literature to express the 
impossibility of the artistic expression which is completely liberated from meaning. That is 
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Beckett‟s obligation, his project of failure. Pascale Casanova, in Samuel Beckett: Anatomy of 
a Literary Revolution, claims that Beckett “became an artist of failure, a writer who „dared to 
fail‟ or to write only that failure – someone who produced „an expressive act, even if only … 
of its impossibility‟” (85). It is possible to read this story as embodying a synecdochic relation 
of sorts, in which the narrator‟s inability to produce the linguistic act demanded by his love, 
comes to stand for a more general lack in language, of the possibility to produce meaningful 
and precise representations of certain abstract phenomena, such as love. Such a reading is in 
line with a deconstructionist view of language: “The deconstructor typically reveals a failure 
of language: namely, the failure of our attempts to use language instrumentally, as the 
expression of some univocal intention or as the means of referring unequivocally to a given 
state of affairs” (Armstrong: 15). 
I have already touched upon the three-walled rooms which surround the narrator at 
least twice in the story. The image of a room with three walls also has an aspect related to the 
narrative in “First Love”, one which hails from the tradition of realist theatre: the theatrical 
stage is typically set in a room with three walls, an invisible fourth wall constituting the 
barrier between the world of the play and the audience outside. When a play – or in this case, 
the story and its narrator – draws attention to itself and its role as fictional, we speak of a 
„breaking of the fourth wall‟; the illusion of the existence of that wall is shattered, and the 
audience is actively made aware that what they are watching or reading is a work of fiction. In 
this story, there are a few points where narration is explicitly directed at the reader. Perhaps 
the most striking occurrence is when the narrator talks about having left the bench – it no 
longer answering to his requirements – for “reasons better not wasted on cunts like you” (33). 
It is peculiar to note that the narrator here actively and aggressively breaks the boundary 
between himself and the reader, thus putting himself in a vulnerable position by yet again 
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situating himself – even if only analogically – in a three-walled room, precisely through 
breaking the fourth wall himself. 
In another passage, which may be read as a more subtle breach in the fourth wall, the 
narrator makes an interesting remark about his own status as narrator. At first glance, this 
passage assumes the shape of a sort of digression, but in truth it appears rather to say 
something integral about reliability of narration, as well as the present situation of the 
narrator. In this passage he has grown tired of the name Lulu, and has thus renamed his 
female companion Anna: 
I thought of Anna then, I who had learnt to think of nothing, nothing except my pains, a quick think 
through, and of what steps to take not to perish off-hand of hunger, or cold, or shame, but never on any 
account of living beings as such (I wonder what that means) whatever I may have said, or may still say, 
to the contrary or otherwise, on this subject. But I have always spoken, no doubt always shall, of things 
that never existed, or that existed if you insist, no doubt always will, but not with the existence I ascribe 
to them. [...] I wrote somewhere, They gave me ... a hat. Now the truth is they never gave me a hat, I 
have always had my own hat, the one my father gave me, and I have never had any other hat than that 
hat. I may add it has followed me to the grave. (35) 
There are several aspects here that are worthy of attention. His wish to think of nothing I have 
already mentioned earlier in this chapter; of more interest at this point is the speaking of 
things that do not exist, or that otherwise – that is, outside of his speaking of them – exist 
differently. The narrative in a fictional story like “First Love”, one may argue, mainly consists 
of the speaking of events that have never happened outside of that narrative, or events that 
may have occurred differently from how they are described in the narrative. In the last quote 
above, the narrator mentions a hat. It is worth nothing in this respect that, outside of this 
citation, the hat is mentioned only once in the story, and then only as a mere sidenote: “I had 
to change, I mean exchange my dressing-gown and nightgown for my travelling costume, I 
mean shoes, socks, trousers, shirt, coat, greatcoat and hat, I can think of nothing else” (29). 
Narrators of other stories written by Beckett around the same time – such as “The End”, 
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which I shall discuss in the next chapter – also frequently talk about their possession of a hat. 
Ackerley and Gontarski propose that the hat “suggests an identity, an entelechy that persists 
despite the changing self” (247). In a way, then, the hat suggests a shared self between the 
different narrators – perhaps even a shared consciousness, if we are to judge by the quote 
above. 
A wholly different aspect of narration surfaces in the very final sentence of the cited 
passage: “I may add it has followed me to the grave.” Little is told about the narrator‟s present 
situation, but from this quote it would seem that he is speaking from some kind of afterlife. 
Earlier in the story he speaks of the inscription he wants on his tombstone, in a manner which 
leaves a rather ambiguous impression regarding whether he is now dead or alive: 
My other writings are no sooner dry than they revolt me, but my epitaph still meets with my approval. 
There is little chance unfortunately of its ever being reared above the skull that conceived it, unless the 
State takes up the matter. But to be unearthed I must first be found, and I greatly fear those gentlemen 
will have as much trouble finding me dead as alive. So I hasten to record it here and now, while there is 
yet time. (26) 
Uncertainty regarding the narrator‟s present situation is not unique for this story; in fact, I 
shall bring up the same point in the forthcoming chapters. The narrator of “First Love” does 
claim here that there is yet time, which would suggest that he is still able to record his epitaph. 
Moreover, he is able to provide narration, which also seems to hint at some sort of a conscious 
existence. However, his claim that “to be unearthed I must first be found”, followed by his 
fear that “the State” will have “as much trouble finding [him] dead as alive” appears to 
suggest that he may already be dead. As seems often to be the case with regards to Beckett‟s 
work, we as readers are left in doubt; there are no clear-cut answers to our questions. 
Nearing the conclusion of this chapter, some points of discussion deserve further 
attention. One such point is the potential connection between the narrator‟s constipation early 
in the text, and his use of biological waste to express his feelings. He mentions, in connection 
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with his visits to the graveyard, how the smell of corpses combined with the thought of the 
dead father almost makes him shed a tear, inarguably a manner – willingly or not – of 
expressing emotion. His spelling Lulu‟s name in cow manure has largely the same effect: it is, 
or he wants for it to be, an expression of how he feels. However, being constipated, he is 
unable to produce biological waste. Considering the connection we have established between 
this waste and his ability to express love, his constipation comes off as an image of precisely 
the lack of that ability. 
This lack of ability is underlined by the narrator‟s focus on the word „love‟, the only 
sense in which he can relate to it. When he mentions love, it is first and foremost in order to 
name the actions that fill in for the lacking expression of the demanding love. One possible 
reading of this story would be as an attempt, by the narrator, at expressing the inexpressible, 
or at expressing the desire for this expression. Given that the story seems to be narrated from 
some kind of afterlife, as suggested by the narrator, it thus stands as a supposedly final 
attempt to express in death what he has never been able to express in life – which leads us 
back to Casanova and the failure of language. If the narrator is indeed dead, then certainly he 
has failed to, as it were, rid himself of his constipation; even if read as a successful expression 
of emotion, the story seems to fall short of reaching anyone that the narrator has a desire to 
reach. But for Beckett the author, it seems as if that failure is deliberate – it is part of his 
project. Casanova observes the following from one of Beckett‟s dialogues with Georges 
Duthuit: 
According to Beckett, with Bram Van Velde a new kind of art had been born. He was the first to have 
accepted the „situation ... of him who, helpless, unable to act, acts, in the event paints, since he is 
obliged to paint‟. Why, Duthuit asked, was he powerless to paint? „Because there is nothing to paint and 
nothing to paint with,‟ Beckett replied: „Van Velde is the first to desist from this estheticized 
automatism, the first to admit that to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail, that failure is his world. 
(84) 
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Considering, then, Beckett‟s stance on art as a whole, it stands to reason that the story – as an 
expression of desire in itself – does not so much fail at succeeding, as it succeeds at failing: 
“its failure spells success” (Caputo 1997b: 45). 
Lulu‟s position in the story has been discussed at length in this chapter, the discussion 
largely associating her with a motherly, protective role with regards to the narrator. However, 
his biological mother has been as absent from this discussion as she is from the narrator‟s 
recollection of the story. Evans claims that “it is the mother‟s presence which testifies to [the 
mother‟s] love. [...] Consequently, the mother‟s absence is experienced as a traumatic 
rejection, as loss of her love” (118-19). The mother is inexpressed; she is present precisely 
through her complete and utter absence – which speaks its own silent language of rejection. 
As for Lulu, who might be read to take up a maternal function, Kristeva sees her rather as a 
substitute for the father. This appears to support the interpretation of the father‟s role as 
ambiguous with regards to the function psychoanalysis typically asserts to the father: he is 
feminized, not just through his providing of space and protection, but through the maternal 
figure of Lulu taking his place. 
It seems fitting to finish the chapter where we started out, namely with the intolerable. 
I stated early in this chapter that there are two intolerable encounters in the text, but I also 
conceded the occurrence of a third encounter to end the story. Now, the encounter described 
by Barthes is intolerable “on account of the joy within it”. With regards to the dead father, the 
joy is visible in the tear that the narrator nearly sheds for his father‟s remains at the graveyard: 
it is the belated realisation of the parental love that he could not feel until the father turned 
into biological waste. Joy is also present with regards to Lulu, who provides the space that he 
was banished from because of the death of the father, and whose presence diverts his mind 
from the pains of thinking too much. The intolerable is a result of a combination of lack and 
absence: the lack of ability to express, through the narrator‟s constipation, together with the 
34 
 
absence of the father, provides the possibility for the others who live there to turn the narrator 
out from his room in the father‟s house. Later, the narrator‟s absence from Lulu – following 
his act of leaving – makes him unable to think of anything but her: “I did not feel easy when I 
was with her, but at least free to think of something else than her, [...]. And I knew that away 
from her I would forfeit this freedom” (39), he says. His lack of understanding of and 
experience with love makes love analogous to a language that he does not speak, but which 
nonetheless constantly surrounds him. “It was my night of love,” he concludes about his first 
night in Lulu‟s parlour, after waking up, to his horror, in a disarray and with a naked Lulu by 
his side. Love becomes a language of misrepresentation, where no act, no expression, fits with 
his reality; love is the intolerable joy, tempting his desires but ultimately – and necessarily – 
failing to deliver. 
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3. A Fiction of Finality: “The End” 
In Beckett‟s play Endgame, Hamm – one of the play‟s two main characters – shares with the 
audience his thoughts about ending: “Enough, it‟s time it ended, in the refuge too. [Pause] 
And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to … to end. Yes, there it is, it‟s time it ended and yet I hesitate 
to – [he yawns] – to end” (Beckett 1958: 12). Somewhat ironically, this speech occurs at the 
very beginning of the play, thus setting the tone for what is to come: a play in which the end 
constantly seems close at hand, and in which any effort taken by the characters seems an 
effort to postpone the end – and yet that very end is precisely what they wish for. The narrator 
and protagonist of “The End” – the story I shall discuss in the present chapter – may very well 
share Hamm‟s sentiments about ending, even though his words would most likely be not only 
less direct, but also significantly greater in number. The narrative style of this story is 
characterized by a lack of direction, largely because of the narrator‟s overly digressive and 
detailed manner of narrating. These aspects – direction, digression and detail – are closely 
interconnected, establishing as such one of three important concepts that shall stand as the 
main points of reference in this chapter. This first of these aspects being primarily one of 
narrative style, the other two are the structural connection between continuation and end, and 
the thematic connection between desire and death. 
It seems natural to start the discussion with the main recurring theme and term in this 
thesis: desire. The thematic connection with death has already been mentioned, but desire is 
also relevant with regards to the stylistic and structural links presented above. Given that 
desire is primarily constituted by lack, it becomes clear that the narrator‟s aimless wanderings 
– seemingly lacking direction, both in a narrative and in a physical sense – are a result of a 
desire for direction, for purpose. Early in the story, after having been evicted from a 
beneficiary home, he expresses his displeasure with his situation, and with the dreaded 
longing that he now experiences: 
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I longed to be under cover again, in an empty place, close and warm, with artificial light, an oil lamp for 
choice, with a pink shade for preference. From time to time someone would come to make sure I was all 
right and needed nothing. It was long since I had longed for anything and the effect on me was horrible. 
(82) 
He seems here to desire to be free of needs, free of longing – ultimately, free of desire; if he 
could lie in his bed at the beneficiary home and do nothing but stare at the ceiling, he would 
be perfectly happy. This is reminiscent to a passage from “First Love”, discussed in the 
previous chapter, where the narrator explains that what matters to him is “supineness in the 
mind, the dulling of the self” (Beckett 1995: 31). It appears that with both of these narrators, 
their sense of contentment is inversely proportional to their mental activity. With regards to 
the present narrator‟s attention to detail in narration, the oil lamp and pink shade that he 
mentions here show merely brief examples of this – even in his fantasies, the most minor of 
details are important enough to be mentioned. His overflow of words is rather more apparent 
when he tells of a crocus bulb acquired from his landlady: 
Once I sent for a crocus bulb and planted it in the dark area, in an old pot. It must have been coming up 
to spring, it was probably not the right time for it. I left the pot outside, attached to a string I passed 
through the window. In the evening, when the weather was fine, a little light crept up the wall. Then I 
sat down beside the window and pulled on the string to keep the pot in the light and warmth. That can‟t 
have been easy, I don‟t see how I managed it. It was probably not the right thing for it. I manured it as 
best I could and pissed on it when the weather was dry. It may not have been the right thing for it. It 
sprouted, but never any flowers, just a wilting stem and a few chlorotic leaves. I would have liked to 
have a yellow crocus, or a hyacinth, but there, it was not to be. (84) 
From the outset of the story, it seems as if all the narrator wishes for is the means to stay 
alive, and if anything else, only a little something to make time pass – such as a crocus bulb to 
care for, if half-heartedly so. His long-winded explanations and digressions here function as 
means to postpone the end; as long as he keeps talking, he can keep the end of the story at an 
arm‟s length. So far, then, it appears that his main desire is to make time pass, and to still be 
alive to see that it indeed does pass. 
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The phrase “go on” is a recurrent one in many of Beckett‟s texts – particularly in his 
prose works – and its presence is also significant in “The End”. “Go on” is relevant here to the 
episodic structure of the narrative, as well as to the final passage of the story. With regards to 
the structure, I refer to it as episodic because it is told as a series of singular but connected 
events – where the apparent connection between events rarely goes further than the narrator‟s 
presence in them. Such a structure relies heavily on a principle of collaboration between end 
and continuation, where the two work together and as parts of the same process, the same 
motion, to spur action forwards: the continuation of the story relies on the narration of each 
event coming to an end, because the end of each narrated event allows the story to go on. But 
the relationship between the two terms is not wholly unproblematic. The closing sentence of 
the story tells of the narrator‟s memory “of the story I might have told, a story in the likeness 
of my life, I mean without the courage to end or the strength to go on” (Beckett 1995: 99; 
emphasis added). The lack of both courage to end and strength to go on constitutes an 
oppositional, even paradoxical desire, for both end and continuation at the same time. 
It is this paradox that leads us to the connection between desire and death. In the 
previous chapter, I only briefly introduced the death drive; here, it shall assume a more central 
role in the discussion. Freud introduces the term in his book Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
the title of which gives us a hint with regards to how Freud considers the death drive to fit in 
with his earlier work: one of the basic premises in Freud‟s psychoanalysis is that our mental 
activity is governed by the pleasure principle – that the drive behind our actions is a drive 
towards pleasure. But the existence of mental activity that does not lead to pleasure, 
necessitates the introduction of a new principle, a new drive, which lies beyond the pleasure 
principle. That drive is the death drive. 
With regards to “First Love”, the death drive was connected with the narrator‟s wish 
to return to the womb, to the unity with the mother. In ”The End”, however, there is no 
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maternal figure at all, thus the death wish must be of a different sort. In Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Freud comes to the tentative conclusion that “the aim of all life is death” (70; 
emphasis original). Our positive drive, our seeking pleasure and life, is only a way to prolong 
the road towards death, Freud claims here, so that we can die in our own way. The narrator‟s 
presentation of death in the form of a vision
6
 appears to support the relevance of the death 
drive here: through it being a mere vision, and therefore lacking physical realisation, it seems 
obvious that what we are presented with here is a desire for end, the desired end, indeed 
nothing less than the perfect death. Maurice Blanchot touches upon a similar idea in his essay 
“Rilke and Death” in The Sirens’ Song: 
His intense desire to die his own death stems from a form of individualism peculiar to the last decade of 
the nineteenth century. [...] To die individually, an individual death, to be an individual to the last, 
unique and undivided, such is the hard kernel that will not be cracked. We must be prepared to die, but 
at the time and in the manner of our choice. We should not die like ordinary people an ordinary death. 
This scorn for anonymous death, for „passing away‟, is really only a reflection of the anguish death‟s 
anonymity provokes; or a willingness to die – to die has a certain dignity – but not to decease. 
(Blanchot: 144; emphasis added) 
The narrator‟s ultimate desire is precisely to “die his own death” rather than merely to pass 
away, “to decease” – which, disregarding his death vision, is what he seems to be doing 
towards the final stages of the story. There is perhaps a connection here between the 
narrator‟s rather anonymous existence throughout the main parts of the story, and this desire 
for a death which is truly his own, his individual death – a death which saves him from 
anonymity at last and at least, in his very final moments. 
It seems, then, that the presence of undesirable mental activity constitutes the presence 
of the death drive. As such, it should be clear enough that the latter is, in some way or other, 
present in the narrator from the beginning of the story. Thus his early desire for the means to 
                                                             
6
 I concede that the reading of the story’s final passage as a vision, and not as an actual occurrence, is not an 
open-and-shut case. I shall touch upon the possibility of the narrator’s death as actual rather than imagined or 
envisioned, but my discussion will first and foremost treat the passage as a vision or fantasy. 
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stay alive seems only to be a wish to be able to pass the time until the right time comes. 
Blanchot points out the importance of dying in “the time and manner of our choice”. Thus, 
until this time and manner comes along, death is anonymous, empty – death is nothing. Yet, 
despite this apparent desire to be an individual in death, the narrator does little to avoid 
anonymity in life. Early on, he wishes more than anything to stay in the beneficiary home, to 
make as little impact as possible on his surroundings. When, later on in the story, he takes to 
begging, he covers the lower part of his face with a rag and he cannot wear his hat because of 
the shape of his skull. It was suggested in the previous chapter that the hat, a recurring item in 
Beckett‟s work, is deeply connected to its owner; it is, in a way, a provider of identity.  
Through covering his face and removing his hat – indeed, even refusing to beg with his hands 
– the narrator here makes himself as anonymous as seems possible. 
This anonymity in life clearly stands in contrast with the desire for an individual death 
– but it may also be the source of that desire. There are several occasions in the story where 
the narrator attempts to take part in society as an independent individual, only to discover that 
any such attempt seems to result in failure: the hat literally hurts his skull, but perhaps also 
metaphorically, as if his identity does not quite fit him; he moves into a basement, trying to 
live as other people do, but ends up being conned out of most of his money, and replaced by a 
pig; he tries taking the bus, but is told to get off – three times; even when trying to befriend a 
cow, he ends up being kicked. Only when he has finally had enough of trying to fit in, does 
the realisation seem to dawn on him that it is easier for him to be anonymous – that 
individuality is better left for death: 
I lay down on the side of the road and began to writhe each time I heard a cart approaching. That was so 
they would not think I was sleeping or resting. I tried to groan, Help! Help! But the tone that came out 
was that of polite conversation. My hour was not yet come and I could no longer groan. [...] What was 
to become of me? I said to myself, I‟ll learn again. I lay down across the road at a narrow place, so that 
the carts could not pass without passing over my body, with one wheel at least, or two if there were 
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four. But the day came when, looking round me, I was in the suburbs, and from there to the old haunts it 
was not far, beyond the stupid hope of rest or less pain. (91) 
This seems to be the point where that “stupid hope” of a life that fulfils is finally given up. 
Henceforth, the narrator rather starts embracing all the shortcomings, the complete lack, in his 
existence. As such, he appears to diminish the lack in a form of positive asceticism where 
having nothing amounts to needing nothing. Lack becomes total, all-encompassing and thus 
meaningless; this complete absence actively takes the place of that which is lacking, and thus 
diminishes the lack. As such, lack loses its meaning through a form of exaggerated inflation – 
with the effect that the narrator in the end lacks nothing. 
I mentioned earlier the stylistic difference between Endgame‟s Hamm and the narrator 
of “The End”. In another play by Beckett, Waiting for Godot, the style is considerably more 
similar: Vladimir and Estragon spend the better parts of two acts merely exploring ways to 
keep talking – in other words, using an overflow of words with little direction, little purpose 
other than to make time pass. A similar tendency is visible both in the narrator of “The End” 
and, as we shall see in the third chapter of this thesis, in “Texts for Nothing”: the act of going 
on, of keeping the narrative going, becomes a means of staying alive. Derrida‟s definition of 
the term différance seems relevant in this regard: in Margins of Philosophy he explains that 
différance brings together the two meanings of the French verb différer, namely „to defer‟ and 
„to differ‟. The former meaning represents the temporization of deferral, the latter represents 
the spacing of difference. To exemplify, Derrida speaks of the sign, which “represents the 
present in its absence. It takes the place of the present. [...] The sign, in this sense, is deferred 
presence” (Derrida 1982: 9). 
Particularly interesting with regards to “The End” is part of Derrida‟s explanation of 
deferral: “to temporize, to take recourse, consciously or unconsciously, in the temporal and 
temporizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfillment of „desire‟ 
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or „will‟” (Derrida 1982: 8-9). Narrative detours are remarkably common in this story, in the 
shape of the narrator‟s digressions and overly detailed descriptions. According to Susan 
Stewart, a narrative that “moves into the „detailed‟ description of action rather than material 
life, [...] calls attention to itself as a manipulation of temporality.” Moreover, she claims, 
narrative digression “stands in tension with narrative closure. It is narrative closure opened 
from the inside out. It holds the reader in suspension, or annoyance, for it presents the 
possibility of never getting back, of remaining forever within the detour” (Stewart: 30). In 
“The End”, there hardly seems to be anything to get back to – as if the entire story is no more 
than a detour, no more than a putting off of the end. The above-cited passage with the crocus 
bulb is one of many such detours; another example is the narrator‟s account of his habit of 
scratching himself: 
I scratched myself in an upward direction, with four nails. I pulled the hairs, to get relief. It passed the 
time, time flew when I scratched myself. Real scratching is superior to masturbation, in my opinion. 
One can masturbate up to the age of seventy, and even beyond, but in the end it becomes a mere habit. 
Whereas to scratch myself properly I would have needed a dozen hands. I itched all over, on the 
privates, in the bush up to the navel, under the arms, in the arse, and then patches of eczema and 
psoriasis that I could set raging merely by thinking of them. (93) 
Such passages are doubly relevant here: first and foremost, as the narrator himself says, 
scratching represents a way of passing the time. Moreover, his richly detailed explanations of 
habits and events, or lack thereof, in the narrator‟s life – such as the scratching – pushes the 
end further away, and provides suspension of any kind of fulfilment or accomplishment. Thus 
he keeps himself busy, he passes the time and suspends the end, both in the narrative and in 
the narration – that is, both in the story he is telling, and by telling it as he does. 
With regards to time, there occurs an interesting contrast in narrative style. In A 
Beckett Canon, Ruby Cohn observes the following: 
[The] narrator can be maniacally explicit about certain matters – his clothes (which belonged to a 
deceased man), his crocus (which never blooms), the way he rides an ass, the way he milks a cow, his 
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carpentry applied to a begging board and to his last refuge in a boat. [...] It is as though the narrator sets 
out to include [...] whatever is usually elided in more conventional stories. (130) 
In contrast to this, the sense of time in narration is lacking to the extent that time becomes 
arbitrary, even meaningless. Frequently, new paragraphs begin with the words “One day ...” 
or the indefinite “Now ...”, and narration of an event often ends with the equally unspecific 
“In the end ...”. The narrator‟s use of the latter phrase is particularly striking, considering the 
title of the story – and yet „striking‟ might not be the most suitable word for it: not one of the 
passages starting with the phrase “In the end ...” stand out as any less mundane or any more 
worthy of attention than the rest of the story. As such there occurs a kind of inflation of the 
phrase, as if with every additional occurrence of it – each time as arbitrary as the last – the 
true end seems even further away. 
In fact, this inflation of sorts may be seen to reach further than just one particular 
phrase: the mere multitude of words at times appears to make each word mean less, as if the 
narrator is in some way emptying the narrated world of meaning. In the later stages of the 
story, he tells of his work as a beggar. While begging, he is one day harassed by a Marxist 
orator. The narrator, in his usual style, accounts for every little detail of the orator‟s speech, 
including the replies of a heckler in the crowd; the orator refers to the narrator as a “down and 
out [and a] leftover. [...] Old, lousy, rotten, ripe for the muckheap” (94). Yet the narrator 
concludes the passage by simply observing that the orator “had a nice face, a little on the red 
side” (95). Through ending the digression as such, he effectively eradicates any potential 
significance that the event might have had; it is as if the orator‟s words mean nothing to him, 
as if they were spoken about someone else. When the narrator decides to pack his begging 
board and leave, it seems to be because of the commotion caused by the orator, rather than 
because he is being harassed: “I went away, although it was still light. But generally speaking 
it was a quiet corner, busy but not overcrowded, thriving and well-frequented” (95). 
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I started this chapter with a quote from Endgame, a quote which leads our attention towards 
the notion of ending. In Reading for the Plot, Peter Brooks chooses to quote that same play in 
a discussion of plot endings: 
Ends, it seems, have become difficult to achieve [in Endgame]. In their absence, or their permanent 
deferral, one is condemned to playing: to concocting endgames, playing in anticipation of a terminal 
structuring moment of revelation that never comes, creating the space of an as-if, a fiction of finality. 
There is a wait for the end that never achieves satisfaction. (313) 
These very words could just as well have been used to describe “The End”. The playing, in 
this case, appears in the form of the long-winded and detailed style of narration, interspersed 
with the odd instance of wordplay and touch of bleak humour – for instance when the narrator 
visits an old, dilapidated cabin in the mountains, and tries to get milk from a cow there: “The 
milk fell to the ground and was lost, but I said to myself, No matter, it‟s free. She dragged me 
across the floor, stopping from time to time only to kick me. I didn‟t know our cows too could 
be so inhuman” (90). The final vision can also be regarded as a sort of playing; it is the vision 
that here represents the “space of an as-if”, the “fiction of finality”. Making a fiction of death 
is first and foremost a way of taking charge, to thus make sure that the end is nothing short of 
the perfect death. 
Moreover, this playing may be a way of making the thoughts of dying less 
overwhelming and easier to handle. Although the vision is perhaps a result of desperation – a 
final attempt to slip away from the cold grip of anonymous, silent death – creating fiction is 
still a game of sorts. Not only does it add a touch of lightness to the otherwise heavy topic at 
hand, it also brings with it a sense of continuation to the end, precisely through being an act of 
creation. This stands in contrast with the section of the story directly preceding the vision, 
which the narrator spends describing his own physical decay, and in which there is a marked 
change in the direction of the story, towards the theme of death and dying. 
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After having moved into his final abode, in an eerily coffin-like boat inside a shed, the 
narrator repeatedly claims that he is content with the present situation. As suggested above, 
his utter state of lack makes him virtually need nothing as far as material goods are concerned. 
Furthermore, being now “under cover again, in an empty place” (82), there is not much else 
for him to wish for, and consequentially there is little more for him to do. And indeed, it soon 
becomes clear that the narrator is weakening and wasting away: 
There were times when I wanted to push away the lid and get out of the boat and couldn‟t, I was so 
indolent and weak, so content deep down where I was. [...] So I waited till the desire to shit, or even to 
piss, lent me wings. I did not want to dirty my nest! And yet it sometimes happened, and even more and 
more often. (97-98) 
Not only are his physical wanderings slowing down to a halt here, even his narrative detours 
become fewer and shorter. It appears as if the narrator is weakening on two levels: both on the 
level of the story itself, where he can hardly get out of his boat, and on the narrative level, on 
which he now seems more direct and less wordy. He continues the above-cited passage of the 
occasional dirtying of the nest: 
Arched and rigid I edged down my trousers and turned a little on my side, just enough to free the hole. 
To contrive a little kingdom, in the midst of the universal muck, then shit on it, ah that was me all over. 
The excrement were me too, I know, I know, but all the same. Enough, enough, the next thing I was 
having visions. (98) 
He seems here to have reached a sort of breaking point, where even he has had enough of his 
own narration. Thus he must go on to find some way of ending it – whence appears the vision 
of his death. 
Returning now to the connection between continuation and end, the link here is also 
pointed out by Cohn, who claims that the narrator‟s “main thread intertwines two themes 
subsumed by the story‟s successive titles – „Suite‟ and „La Fin‟ (Continuation and End)” 
(Cohn: 131). Derrida discusses the topic of titles in his essay “Before the Law”, claiming that 
a title “is placed in a specific position, highly regulated by conventional laws: at the beginning 
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of and at a set distance above the body of a text, but in any case before it.” Furthermore, he 
states, the title “names and guarantees the identity, the unity and the boundaries of the original 
work which it entitles” (Derrida 1992b: 188). In other words, the title of a story typically 
represents a sort of focusing gesture, a hint as to who or what the author intends us, as readers, 
to pay particular attention to – we are provided with a way in.  Interestingly, this particular 
title – although placed traditionally at the beginning – leads our attention to a very specific 
part of the story, namely the final passage: it suggests that it is in the end that we find the 
identity, the unity and the boundaries of this story; the end is the key. 
However, as pointed out by Cohn, the original title also plays a role here: as she 
mentions, the French word „suite‟ can be translated as „continuation‟ – but it can also mean 
„result‟, a word which not only shares similar connotations with „end‟, but which also reminds 
us of the double meaning of „end‟: so far in this discussion, I have referred to this term solely 
in the sense of „finitude‟. But we may also read „end‟ to mean „purpose‟, „goal‟ or indeed 
„result‟. As such, the title is slightly ambiguous; we cannot know for certain to which sense of 
„end‟ it refers. As such, it is too simple to assume that the title necessarily refers merely to the 
final passage of the text, or to the closing stage of the narrator‟s life. Rather, it seems 
plausible to read the title as playing with its own ambiguity: certainly it does suggest that we 
pay particular attention to the end of the story; but furthermore, if read in the sense of end1, it 
hints at another integral aspect of the narrative, namely the apparent lack of purpose and 
direction in the narrator‟s existence. That is, until the act of finality, of reaching the end, 
becomes the purpose, the desired result – the end becomes the end. 
Moreover, the ambiguity in the title may also reflect the ambiguity in how the narrator 
relates to the different senses of „end‟ throughout the story: on the one hand, he goes from 
wandering around the city with no apparent goal, to finding a purpose in death, in escaping 
anonymity in death; on the other hand, he goes from deferring his own end – through his 
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long-winded narrative style, and through keeping himself occupied – to embracing that end, 
even envisioning it. Yet, for all the desire for a true end, a singular death that sets him apart, 
there is ambiguity to be found even here, in the vision. The very final passage has been 
touched upon before, and begs repetition here: 
I swallowed my calmative. The sea, the sky, the mountains and the islands closed in and crushed me in 
a mighty systole, then scattered to the uttermost confines of space. The memory came faint and cold of 
the story I might have told, a story in the likeness of my life, I mean without the courage to end or the 
strength to go on. (99) 
The ambiguity shines through particularly in the very final sentence: in a near-clichéd 
moment of death, where his life seems to pass before his eyes, he concludes that the story of 
his life is one stuck in limbo – it never stops going nowhere. Ambiguous, too, is the calmative 
that he mentions, the need of which is likely to be caused by an anxiety about reaching, 
finally, the end. 
Furthermore, this passage emits an immense and overwhelming powerlessness, one 
which not so much immobilises narration as it implodes it; narration turns inwards and pulls 
away the already unstable ground beneath itself. With neither the courage to end nor the 
strength to go on, narration is caught in an impossible space where nothing can exist, nothing 
can have existed. In The Sense of an Ending, Frank Kermode briefly discusses Beckett: 
[Beckett] is the perverse theologian of a world which has suffered a Fall, experienced an Incarnation 
which changes all relations of past, present and future, but which will not be redeemed. Time is an 
endless transition from one condition of misery to another, „a passion without form or stations,‟ to be 
ended by no parousia. It is a world crying out [...] for apocalypse; all it gets is vain temporality, mad, 
multiform antithetical influx.” (115; emphasis original) 
The narrator waits for an apocalypse that never comes, and as such decides to provide one of 
his own. His words seem carefully chosen in all their apocalyptic grandeur: “The sea, the sky, 
the mountains and the islands closed in and crushed me in a mighty systole, then scattered to 
the uttermost confines of space.” Yet what follows seems to completely disintegrate this 
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grand finale, and instead of going out with a bang, the story fades out in a grounded loop, 
doomed for all eternity to repeat itself: “without the courage to end or the strength to go on.” 
I have referred to the final passage of the story exclusively as a vision, which the 
present reading more or less demands it to be. However, according to Ackerley and Gontarski, 
in this story “distinctions between what occurs and what is imagined become impossible to 
determine” (172). Following their claim, then, it is difficult to rule out completely the 
possibility that the end presents not a fictional death, but a real one. However, I shall point to 
some aspects which I consider suggestive towards a reading of the conclusive passage as a 
vision. The narrator first introduces a vision of himself in his boat, floating on the waters 
presumably outside the city in which he has spent most of the story wandering about (98). The 
narration of this vision is interspersed with related memories of him as a child, watching the 
lights of the city with his father – twice he wanders off from the vision to a childhood 
memory. Here it is important to note his own reaction to these brief digressions: the first time 
he quickly reminds himself to “have done with these visions”, to get on with it. The second 
time, he is slightly more ambiguous: 
And on the slopes of the mountain, now rearing its unbroken bulk behind the town, the fires turned from 
gold to red, from red to gold. I knew what it was, it was the gorse burning. How often I had set match to 
it myself, as a child. And hours later, back in my home, before I climbed into bed, I watched from my 
high window the fires I had lit. That night then, all aglow with distant fires, on sea, on land and in the 
sky, I drifted with the currents and the tides. (99) 
I claim that this is more ambiguous first and foremost because of the lacking reference when 
he jumps from the memory to “that night”. I deem it likely that “that night” refers back to the 
vision, but also concede the possibility that it might refer to the actual night that he had a 
vision of floating around the bay, in his boat – the narrative of which is now ended. 
The reading of the end of the story as a vision is also related to the thematic 
connection between desire and death. I have pointed to the passage of the vision as perhaps 
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the clearest sign of the narrator‟s desire to die, precisely because it is a vision, a fantasy. But if 
we consider again the principle behind the death drive, yet another ambiguity surfaces. The 
death drive is a concept which Freud bases on the existence of destructive mental activity – 
but what kind of mental activity does this vision represent? At first sight, it would seem that it 
is quite clearly destructive, if only because it is a vision of death. But it also envisions the 
fulfillment of desire, namely the desire for end. As such, it is difficult to argue that the vision 
is entirely destructive, entirely negative. The objective of the narrator‟s desire is not 
necessarily death, first and foremost; rather, it is the end of “the stupid hope of rest or less 
pain”, the end of all the suffering that he has spent most of the story relating to us.  
In the introductory chapter, I emphasized Beckett‟s obligation to express. In the quote 
discussed in that chapter, obligation is the only active presence in Beckett‟s statement; 
obligation is all that he has. With the narrator of “The End” there also seems to be an 
obligation – if not obsession – to relate to the reader even the smallest and most insignificant 
piece of information. Without necessarily assuming that Beckett wrote the story with an 
active political message in mind, there is here a parallel to be found to the work of Walter 
Benjamin, and his “Theses on the Philosophy of History”. Here he argues for a kind of 
narration which is in some ways similar to that found in “The End,” when he claims that 
“nothing that  has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history,” and that “only for a 
redeemed mankind has its past become citable in all its moments” (246). Now, considering 
the narrator of “The End” to be a part of a “redeemed mankind” seems on the verge of parody 
– he is barely part of mankind at all. Benjamin‟s point, however, is that the approach to 
history that he calls material historicism will let every voice speak, no matter the status or 
social position of the speaker. This view is certainly compatible with the typical narrator in 
Beckett‟s work, often a social outcast in the lower ends of society. Benjamin‟s point here is 
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reminiscent of the postmodern view I mentioned in the introduction, as presented by Lyotard 
– specifically the resistance to progress and the grand narrative. 
As for Beckett‟s obligation to express, then, it appears that the voices that come to 
speak through this obligation are those that otherwise would not, or could not, speak. In the 
introductory chapter, I cited from Harvey the question “what do you do when „I can‟t‟ meets 
„I must‟?” (Casanova: 85). The final sentence of “The End” seems to be related to this 
question, but here “I can‟t” is doubled up against itself. Ability is disintegrated, but obligation 
still remains. The desired death of the narrator, the desire to reach the end of the story, may as 
such be seen to represent a desire in Beckett to exhaust his obligation to writing, to end his 
debt to literature. But the obligation to express, as we have seen in the introductory chapter, 
withstands even the lack of means to express, and as such Beckett is doomed to failure also 
with regards to his desire to end. The presence of this desire seems inarguable in “The End”, 
yet the story only scratches the surface of what is to come from Beckett in this regard. While 
the envisioned death of the narrator is certainly a strong image – precisely because it 
expresses so clearly a desire for end – the measures taken towards effacement of narration in 
“Texts for Nothing” are, as we shall soon see, significantly greater. 
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4. The Words to End All Words: “Texts for Nothing” 
In a discussion on negative theology, Jacques Derrida claims that “[t]o speak for nothing is 
not: not to speak. Above all, it is not to speak for no one” (Derrida 1992a: 76; emphasis 
original). What Derrida refers to speaking for nothing as “[speaking] only for the sake of 
speaking, in order to experience speech” (75). In Beckett‟s “Texts for Nothing” the narrator7 
appears precisely to speak for the sake of speaking – not only to experience speech, but to 
experience anything at all. In these thirteen texts there is “no plot, no characters, no 
progressive structures” (Wolosky: 220); whatever actions are present above the narrative act 
itself, exist merely as more or less vague memories or fantasies. To a significant extent the 
texts consist of a shapeless narrator, a mere voice, whom at first sight cannot seem to decide 
whether it is speaking just to stay alive or rather to pass the time till death‟s release.  
It seems relevant to point out here, that I shall treat the collection of texts mainly in 
terms of what Galen Strawson sees as “a narrative”: that there is “a certain sort of 
developmental and hence temporal unity or coherence to the things to which it is standardly 
applied – lives, parts of lives, pieces of writing“ (74; emphasis original). This is to say that I 
choose to read “Texts for Nothing” mainly as a collection, where the texts are – if only 
loosely – tied to each other, rather than as thirteen independent texts. My reading will also be 
fairly selective, focusing more on singular passages than on the collection in its entirety. I 
shall treat the texts first and foremost with regards to how the narrator, through the narrative 
act, relates to itself and its role as bodiless voice, as medium and (communicator of) text. 
Furthermore, I shall take a closer look at the story that the narrator appears to wish to tell, 
including the above-mentioned memories and fantasies. It is worth noting that there is no 
clear-cut division between these two aspects of the texts, and that all of the following is 
                                                             
7
 I shall refer to the narrator in singular terms, although I concede the possibility that there is more than one 
narrator in “Texts for Nothing”. This issue will not be a main concern here.  
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interconnected rather than separated into two different „readings‟. I introduce the two aspects 
here as separate for the sake of analytical clarity. 
 I opened with the quote from Derrida because I want to illustrate a particular 
connection that I see between the primary text and the reference quote; in this particular case 
that connection leans rather heavily, although perhaps not entirely, on the phrase “for 
nothing.” According to Derrida and his discussion of negative theology, “speaking for 
nothing” does not mean not to speak, nor to speak for no one. It is also “not entirely to speak 
in vain [nor] to say nothing” (75). I shall try a little experiment8 – an experiment which may 
not be quite by the book, as it were, but which will hopefully lead to some worthwhile results 
nonetheless: by negating the negatives, I will attempt to reach a tentative conclusion about 
this issue. Taking a step away from Derrida‟s negative theology – that is to say, attempting to 
say what speaking for nothing is, instead of what it is not – we can lead from this the possible 
conclusion that speaking for nothing is (a) speaking (b) to/for someone (c) saying something 
(d) for the sake of speech. Thus, to speak for nothing appears to be an action where speech is 
the means as well as the end; one might say, perhaps, that it is speech to the end of speech.  
 Following the same logic we may read the title “Texts for Nothing” to designate text 
for the sake of text, text to the end of text. We thus have a collection of texts for nothing, in 
each of which there is a narrator who speaks for nothing; we have text to the end of text, 
language to the end of language. It is time now to linger for a second on the word „end‟; it is a 
word for which a particular space is saved in “Texts for Nothing” – a space which, I shall 
argue, represents a double meaning, a pun. I mentioned the two meanings of „end‟ in 
discussion of “The End”, but to briefly refresh: on the one hand, „end‟ refers to finitude, a 
final point or cessation; on the other hand, it may stand for purpose, reason or goal. Both of 
                                                             
8 This experiment carries an agenda, on behalf of which I can only apologize for the unfortunate betrayal of 
negative theology. Defeating the point of said theology is a means to an end, and it is my hope that the end will 
justify this means. 
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these senses of „end‟ are highly relevant to the texts, but the word itself is used sparingly and 
without much fanfare. Rather, „end‟ has a different kind of presence in these texts:  its 
meanings are more present than the word, signifying, yet again, a desire for end. I shall 
illustrate this with an example from text 6: “what is it, this unnamable thing that I name and 
name and never wear out, and I call that words. It‟s because I haven‟t hit on the right ones, the 
killers, haven‟t yet heaved them up from that heart-burning glut of words, with what words 
shall I name my unnamable words?” (125; emphasis added). Paraphrased as pun: the end is 
the end; or, all punning aside, the goal is to reach the final word. Desire steps up in the 
impossible shape of the unnamable words, “the killers,” that can put an end to all words, an 
end to speech – for, as the narrator himself9 neatly sums it up,  “it‟s the end gives the meaning 
to words” (131).  I shall argue in this chapter that desire is ever-present in these texts precisely 
due to the double meaning of the word end.  
 By insisting upon the presence of desire, I also imply the presence of a desiring 
subject; that is to say, I imply that the narrator has such subjective traits as to qualify him as a 
possible source of desire. Elliot Krieger, in his article “Samuel Beckett‟s Texts for Nothing: 
Explication and Exposition,” appears more uncertain about this, when he claims that “there is 
no first-person narrator. The „I‟ that speaks throughout the Texts is not a person, but is the text 
itself, the black words printed on the white page” (Krieger 987). His reading raises an 
important question: what is a narrator? Moreover, can we rightfully claim a text – the black 
words on the white page – to assume the role of a subjective entity? I shall, for now, leave the 
latter question open. As for the former, Mieke Bal presents a fairly uncomplicated and 
straight-forward answer to the question, in Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of 
Narrative: “As soon as there is language, there is a speaker who utters it; as soon as those 
linguistic utterances constitute a narrative text, there is a narrator, a narrative subject” (22). It 
                                                             
9 I do not wish to force a gender upon the narrator, but for the sake of simplicity I will refer to the narrator as 
male. 
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remains uncertain to me whether Krieger sees the text as an actual narrative subject, and as 
such I cannot say whether or not Bal‟s definition contradicts Krieger‟s claim. Furthermore, it 
is not entirely clear what a narrative text is. Bal claims that it is “a text in which an agent 
relates („tells‟) a story in a particular medium, such as language” (5). As I shall come back to 
later in this chapter, one may reasonably question whether or not the narrator in Beckett‟s 
texts succeeds in telling a story. One may also, then, question whether these are narrative 
texts, and as such whether or not they have a narrator. However, in my treatment of the texts I 
choose to consider even the attempt at telling a story – successful or not – sufficient to earn 
the status of narrator.  
 I stated, above, that desire for an end is present in two senses, purpose as well as 
finitude. However, there is also a desire to go on, to keep up the pace, to not end. This leads 
back to speaking for nothing, speaking to the end of speech. We may read these two desires, 
to end and to go on, as oppositional, working against each other, creating a back-and-forth 
dynamic. However, we may also read them as one and the same; the desire to end is not a 
desire to simply stop talking. It is a desire to end speech, to end words. It is a desire to find 
“the killers”; the narrator has a desire to keep the narrative going until the end is reached. It is 
on a similar note that Jonathan Boulter argues that “Texts for Nothing” represents, for 
Beckett, an “attempt to find the „literature of the unword‟,” an attempt which the author 
himself considered a failure “to put an end, finally, to the human” (Boulter: 131). My claim is 
that failure is implicit in the desire to reach the end of expression, the end of language. This 
failure is largely grounded in the paradoxical act of ending: as long as that act is kept up, as 
long as one keeps ending, the end is necessarily kept at an arm‟s length. The attempt to 
express to the end of expression, then, seems to necessitate failure. As mentioned in the 
chapter on “First Love”, Pascale Casanova sees this failure as largely intentional, claiming 
Beckett to be a writer who “dared to fail”, an artist of failure. If indeed failure is the intention, 
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one may argue that Beckett cannot help but succeed – or, more precisely, success and failure 
engage in an everlasting chase in which none will be able to catch up with the other.   
The above-mentioned desire to go on has further implications if read in relation with 
the sense of physical movement, or rather lack thereof, in these texts. The narrator can, indeed 
must, „go on‟ with his narrative, but he cannot go at all in a more physical sense: if one 
disregards an implied sense of movement in the act of narration, he has no means of mobility. 
In text 3 he appears to make an attempt at finding the words that can make him exist 
physically, using narration as a means to create a body. “It‟s enough to will it,” he says, “I‟ll 
will it, will me a body, will me a head, a little strength, a little courage, I‟m starting now” 
(109). Following this, his desire takes the shape of visions or fantasies of being human and 
having human relations, all of which I shall discuss more at length later in this chapter. 
Towards the end of the text he returns to the narration of his own body: 
 [To] sprout a head at last, all my very own, […] and legs to kick my heels with, I‟d be there at last, I 
could go at last, it‟s all I ask, no, I can‟t ask anything. Just the head and two legs, or one, in the middle, 
I‟d go hopping. Or just the head, nice and round, […] I‟d go rolling, downhill, almost a pure spirit, no, 
that wouldn‟t work, all is uphill from here. (113) 
However, all he seems to obtain from this is the hopeless realization that physical being, to 
him, is impossible: 
I‟m here, that‟s all I know, and that it‟s still not me […]. There is no flesh anywhere, nor any way to 
die. Leave all that, to want to leave all that, not knowing what that means, all that, it‟s soon said, soon 
done, in vain, nothing has stirred, no one has spoken. Here, nothing will happen here, no one will be 
here, for many a long day. (113) 
There is a sense here of self-effacement. Shira Wolosky states that “the conduct of these Texts 
is in great part the persistent denunciation of body, character, figure, voice, language, in the 
name of an interiority and essentiality before and beyond it. […] In general in Beckett there is 
a double impulse toward invention and refutation” (Wolosky: 221). The above-mentioned 
narration of a body, of a physical being, is one example of the invention to which she refers. 
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The refutation can be seen in the quote above; narration takes a turn inwards in order to, as it 
were, tear itself, as well as the narrator, apart at the seams. “No one has spoken,” he says, as if 
the entire text never happened.  
Such denunciation is even more evident in the final text of the collection, where the 
narrator‟s “weak old voice that tried in vain to make me” (152) is dying away. This final text 
gives the impression of attempting to undo all that the other texts have tried, and successfully 
failed, to accomplish: “we‟re ended who never were, soon there will be nothing where there 
was never anything” (154). Seeing as “we” never were, seeing as there “was never anything”, 
this text may be read as expression reversed, rather literally as taking back expression. But I 
am being vague: what does it mean to “take back expression”? Is it to regret what one has 
expressed, to the extent that one wishes to render it “never-having-been-expressed”? Or is it 
to regain expression – to regain the power, the ability, to express? If we follow through the 
former question first, we encounter a possible paradox: if there never was and if “we” never 
were anything, then there was never anything to take back. Can we assume, then, that what is 
taken back is nothing? Before attempting to answer this question, it might be useful to look 
closer at the role of the term „nothing‟ in these texts. 
Related to the concept of „nothing‟ is what I shall call the „silent signifier‟. Calling this 
a signifier is paradoxical, in the sense that it stands for precisely the lack of a signifier. More 
precisely, it stands for the lack – in language in a general sense – of a signifier for meaningful 
silence, a “silence that is not silence” (125). In a way, the silent signifier is a subversion of 
what Claude Lévi-Strauss calls the floating signifier, which has “symbolic value zero” 
(Mehlman: 23). Briefly put, the floating signifier is a signifier without a definite signified. 
The silent signifier, on the other hand, points to the lack of a definite signifier to refer to a 
particular signified: the pause that is meaningful precisely because it is a pause, precisely 
because of the lack of a signifier. The narrator of “Texts for Nothing” points to that lack in 
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text 5, which appears to take place in a courtroom, with the narrator serving in every role: 
“I‟m the clerk, [...] the scribe, [...] judge and party, witness and advocate” (117). This 
courtroom, as it turns out, may be read to be situated inside his head – the existence of which 
is questioned by the narrator himself: “all these voices, like a rattling of chains in my head, 
rattling to me that I have a head. That‟s where the court sits this evening, […] that‟s where 
I‟m clerk and scribe, not understanding what I hear, not knowing what I write” (120). His job, 
as a scribe, is to note down what is uttered. The problem occurs when something is expressed 
without being uttered: “What do I do when silence falls, with rhetorical intent, or denoting 
lassitude, perplexity, consternation” (119). The silent signifier, just like desire, always stands 
for a lack – its “existence” is constituted by the lack of something, which at the same time 
cannot be something because that would imply that it is; the silent signifier stands for a 
something-that-is-not(-something). This lack here becomes an explicit issue, constituting a 
double expression of desire. It is on the one hand the repeated expression of the desire to 
inexpress, that is to have the means to signify the meaningful silence. On the other hand, we 
see a narrative desire here, which may be rooted in a desire of the author: the narrator desires 
to speak without speaking, but he cannot, for lack of means, for lack of the words that can 
truthfully not-speak. Thus he must write without writing, without words.  
Early on in this chapter I performed an experiment on a quote by Derrida. I shall risk 
one more attempt at such an experiment – yet again in good faith and in the hope that the end 
will justify the means. Now, speech without speech should amount to the equivalent of n 
minus n – the sum of which is nothing. The tentative conclusion that follows is that the 
narrator desires to express nothing – leading us back to the title, “Texts for Nothing.” 
According to James Knowlson and John Pilling, in Frescoes of the Skull, “the title is derived 
from the musical term mesure pour rien, meaning „a bar‟s rest‟, and hence, in literary terms, 
„a group of words conveying nothing‟” (42; emphasis original). „Nothing‟, then, seems a 
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central term both in “Texts for Nothing” and in this chapter – the question is as follows: what 
is „nothing‟, what does it stand for? Wolosky sums up four different stances which together 
represent something of a norm in Beckett criticism: 
(1) That Beckett‟s nothing […] designates a transcendent fullness opposed to the material world from 
which ascetic withdrawal is urged […]. (2) That the nothing signifies an ultimate transcendence which 
however cannot be attained despite ascetic withdrawal from the material world […]. (3) That the 
material world is utterly repudiated in the name of a transcendent nothing absolutely antithetical to it 
[…]. And (4) that at the core of reality, when all appearances have been stripped away, there is only an 
existential void […] (Wolosky: 225) 
Ackerley and Gontarski write about “Texts for Nothing” that it is “as close as [Beckett] ever 
got to the expression of the impossibility to express, when there is nothing to express and no 
means by which to do so” (410). I shall propose a reading of „nothing‟ which may be seen to 
represent a fifth stance, but which in truth lies relatively close to the fourth stance presented 
by Wolosky. In words similar to hers, one may formulate it as such: at the core of language, 
when all means and ends have been stripped away, there is only an expressionless void. 
Presented in fewer words, then, I shall see nothing as the impossibility to express without end 
and without means. In the introductory chapter I addressed Beckett‟s statement about art in 
one of his dialogues with Georges Duthuit. There, I took the phrase “there is nothing to 
express” to stand for a liberation of art from meaning – and I took the phrase “there is nothing 
with which to express” to stand for the impossibility to execute said liberation. That is to say, 
Beckett aims, desires, for art to express without end and without means – to express nothing.  
I asked, above, what it means to take back expression. If we read text 13 as a “taking 
back” of the first twelve texts, can we assume that what is taken back is “nothing”, such as it 
has been tentatively defined above? I would claim that we cannot. Any discussion of the 
terms „nothing‟ and „something‟ appears to have a tendency to circle around itself and amount 
to paradoxes. However, it seems clear that  it is a necessary burden of being part of a binary 
opposition that the one opposite cannot appear without the other. Nothing always implies 
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something – and the other way around. Derrida stated that speaking for nothing is not “not to 
speak” – neither, then, does being for nothing mean “not to be”. As such I claim that taking 
back texts for nothing is not to take back nothing, but rather to take back something. What is 
taken back here is the something-that-is-not-something; what is taken back is the expression 
of nothing: the presence of that lack of possibility for expression free of meaning. 
I have suggested two possible interpretations of the term “taking back expression”. 
What might be termed a regret of expression has been treated, although not conclusively, in 
the discussion above, but I have yet to address the regaining of expression. To regain the 
power to express, it seems evident that one must be in a state of lack: one has been in 
possession of that power, but one has since lost it. As such, it seems as if “Texts for Nothing” 
must be constituted by a form of powerless expression, a type of expression which has no 
uttering power behind it. But how then, we may ask, can these texts be uttered at all? How can 
they exist if there is no power to express them? I propose that it is precisely the lack of power 
that produces the texts: lack, yet again, constitutes the absence which is filled by desire – the 
desire for power to express. This desire is what makes “Texts for Nothing” happen.  
I have briefly mentioned the “weak old voice” which, in the final text, is dying away. 
In an attempt to separate himself from the one characteristic trait we have to go by – his voice 
– the narrator proceeds to interrupt narration through announcing the death of the voice mid-
sentence: 
No voice ever but it in my life, it says, if speaking of me one can speak of life, and it 
can, it still can, or if not life, there it dies […], once you‟ve spoken of me you can 
speak of anything, up to the point where, up to the time when, there it dies, it can‟t go 
on, it‟s been its death, speaking of me […]. Whose voice, no one‟s, there is no one, 
there‟s a voice without a mouth. (152) 
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The narrator claims that speaking of him has been the death of the voice. But ultimately there 
is no one else, nothing else, to speak of; every attempt at producing a story, with scenes, 
characters, actions, has failed. As such, perhaps, the voice has finally spoken to the end of 
speech. In that respect, it appears relevant to recall, yet again, the desired liberation of art 
from meaning: through claiming that nothing exists but the voice, the narrator in a way 
renders it meaningless; if a voice is all that is, then what the voice says is of no consequence – 
in fact, what the voice says is not. The voice says nothing. 
The interruption of narration is foreshadowed in text 2, where the narrator claims that 
“the subject dies before it comes to the verb” (106). An obvious implication here is one 
reminiscent of a famous single-sentence summary of Beckett‟s play Waiting for Godot, in 
which the Irish literary critic Vivian Mercier claimed that it is a play in which ”nothing happens, 
twice”. In “Texts for Nothing” no one takes action, no one does anything – nothing happens, 
thirteen times. If the subject dies before it comes to the verb, then the sentence ends with no 
action having been taken. But there is another implication here: the narrator is constituted 
through words and words only – the end of the sentence is the end of him. It is perhaps this 
end that he fears in another passage from text 2: 
So long as the words keep coming nothing will have changed, there are the old words out again. Utter, 
there‟s nothing else, utter, void yourself of them, here as always, nothing else. But they are failing, true, 
that‟s the change, they are failing, that‟s bad, bad. Or it‟s the dread of coming to the last, of having said 
all, your all, before the end, no, for that will be the end, the end of all, not certain.  (106) 
Through his lack of physical presence, all that is left to determine the narrator‟s existence is 
his words. Thus by extension, utterance as a means of voiding himself of words amounts to 
little more than the committing of narrative suicide. From this follows the dread that he 
presents here – a dread of dying before the verb, so to speak. A dread of reaching the end of 
the sentence before the sentence has reached the end. That will be the end of all, the narrator 
explains, before seeking shelter in ambiguity, adding “not certain”.  
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 As I touched upon earlier in this chapter, the implied double meaning of „end‟ is 
central for my reading of these texts. As hinted at above, I say that it is implied not because 
the word is wholly absent from the texts, but because I see its role as more significant than the 
actual usage of the word in this work may suggests. However, there are passages in which a 
certain importance is applied to its presence: “better be silent,” the narrator says, “it‟s the only 
method, if you want to end, not a word but smiles, end rent with stifled imprecations, burst 
with speechlessness” (107). The paradoxical presence of the silent signifier – represented here 
by the stifled imprecations and speechlessness – makes it impossible to end; end is 
disintegrated by a silence, the destructive force of which springs from the tension created by 
the presence of meaning running into the absence of a signifier. All that is left is inexpression. 
Leaving behind the meta-narrative aspect for a while, I shall now proceed to a closer 
examination of the story that the narrator appears to want to tell – or rather, perhaps, to be in 
possession of. At several points in “Texts for Nothing” the narrator expresses a desire to have 
a story to tell, to be able to tell a story. The attempts, however, largely amount to mere 
glimpses, memories and fantasies of a life, perhaps, once lived. In text 6, while speaking 
about the search for the right words to end, he presents what looks like an optimistic outlook: 
“I have high hopes, I give you my word, high hopes, that one day I may tell a story” (125). 
According to Knowlson and Pilling, the narrator‟s “situation is at once revealed to be an 
essentially post mortem one” (45). One possible reading, then, would be that the narrator is a 
soul in purgatory, trying in vain to tell a story, “with living creatures coming and going on a 
habitable earth crammed with the dead” (126). I have mentioned how he tries to create a 
physical appearance for himself through narration, to narrate himself a body. Drawing further 
on this image, we may see narration also as a potential means of mobility for the narrator – in 
which case the inability to continue narration would equal the inability to move, to go on. In 
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other words, not being able to tell a story, the narrator is stuck in his present state of 
purgatory.  
This immobility of sorts, the problem of not being able to go on, is related to the 
narrator‟s attempt at finding the silent signifier precisely because of the lack of a story in the 
narrator‟s life. The narrator needs to, indeed desires to tell a story without having a story to 
tell – thus yet again he is searching for the (in)expression that lets him relate the story for 
which no words exist, the language that can truthfully express the story in which nothing 
happens. But he knows no such language, and so lacking the possibility to tell a story, the 
narrator “cannot help but generate scenes and then proceed to people them” (Wolosky 221). 
In text 2, for instance, he talks of Mother Calvet, who “knew what she liked, perhaps even 
what she would have liked,” but limited imagination cuts her short and he cannot think of a 
story for her: “the mind slow, slow, nearly stopped […]. The words too, slow, slow, the 
subject dies before it comes to the verb” (106). I suggested above that the latter phrase carries 
an implication for the entire collection of texts. Read in its immediate context, however, it 
also carries negative implications concerning the narrator‟s ability to tell a story.   
Text 4 takes up the problem of storytelling rather directly, when the narrator talks 
about a third person, a “him”, who “tells his story every five minutes, saying it is not his, 
there‟s cleverness for you. He would like it to be my fault that he has no story, of course he 
has no story, that‟s no reason for trying to foist one on me” (115). Krieger suggests that this 
third person refers to the author, claiming that “the narrator is […] distinguished from the 
writer, Beckett, through a pronominal process” (995). Early on in his article, Krieger claims 
that the first text “accomplishes the difficult task of presenting us with clues enough so we 
can determine that the narrator is the printed text and not an imagined human character” (987-
8). As such, he appears to read the texts as riddles of sorts, where the implied author leaves us 
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clues from which we should be able to “solve” the conundrum that the texts present to us as 
readers. 
And indeed, text 4 does provide us with some clues that might point towards “him” as 
referring to the author. In no other text does the narrator refer as clearly to other literary 
works, works written by none other than the author himself: “treat him like that, like a vulgar 
Molloy, a common Malone, those mere mortals, happy mortals” (115). Krieger‟s claim is that 
the text, as narrator, is trying to gain independence from its author; it “reverses the ordinary 
process and uses the strength of its own atemporality both to control its own author and to 
attain its own mortal life” (Krieger: 996). That is to say, the text reverses the traditional 
relationship between author and narrator; whereas in a traditional narrative the narrator‟s 
voice would, as it were, carry out the narrative will of the author, the narrator here appears to 
act on his own accord, as if the author cannot quiet the narrator‟s voice. Reading it thus, the 
division between the two appears problematic, an issue which is soon emphasized: “That‟s 
how he speaks, this evening, how he has me speak, how he speaks to himself, how I speak, 
there is only me, this evening, here, on earth, and a voice that makes no sound because it goes 
towards none” (115). They both speak, but not to each other – they both speak, but without a 
listener. Now, speaking without a listener does not quite amount to speech without speech, 
because speech in itself does not necessitate that someone hear it. However, if there is no one 
to listen, then what is said seems of little consequence. In a sense it becomes meaningless, it 
becomes a kind of silence, “a voice that makes no sound”. 
Another interesting point follows from the narrator‟s claim that “he‟s looking to kill 
me, to have me dead like him, dead like the living” (114). Following the reading discussed 
above, it seems fairly plausible to assume that the murderer here is the author himself. The 
question is, what does killing the narrator of these texts amount to? It was hinted above that 
the narrator is in a sense rebelling against the author, as if he is trying to free himself from the 
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grip of the author. Killing that narrator would put a stop to this rebellion, but it would 
necessitate the author to come up with another narrator to carry out his authoritative will – 
one, perhaps, just as eager to take control of his own narration as the previous one. The death 
of the narrator, literally at the hands of the author, may be likened to a sort of reversed 
patricide: on the one hand, the narrator is the author‟s brainchild, as it were. But on the other 
hand, the author has no say, so to speak, with regards to narration, without the presence of the 
narrator through which the author communicates and expresses his will. A potential killing of 
the narrator – that is, an action that would result in the lack of a narrator – may then stand as a 
twofold, and contradictory, expression of desire: the desire for the narrator‟s death betrays a 
desire to end words, to end expression; the resulting lack of a narrator would then leave the 
author with the opposite, namely the desire for means of expression. This slightly paradoxical 
battle of desires may stand as an image of a destruction of desire, a wish to be rid of desire – 
ultimately, a desire to not desire. In text 3 the narrator expresses what may be read as a fear of 
desire: “no one‟s going to love you, don‟t be alarmed” (110). Recalling that desire represents 
a lack, we may see the lack which constitutes this fear of desire to be the lack of power to 
express nothing. Killing the narrator thus stands as a means of getting rid of a representation 
of lack, thus regaining – taking back – that power. 
I have already mentioned the relationship between success and failure in Beckett‟s 
literature, the two endlessly chasing one another, with no real possibility of catching up. 
Knowlson and Pilling observe that “Beckett‟s aesthetic at this time [of writing „Texts for 
Nothing‟] was predicated upon failure and the unavoidability of failure” (41). Moreover, they 
see “Texts for Nothing” as revelling in variations of failure: “Each strategy which the voice 
engages in, in order to settle decisively the question of whether or not it is substantial, 
founders because there is no external, ratifying element that will guarantee its substantiality” 
(44). There seems to be a particular presence here of what may be termed a constitutional 
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failure, in the sense that the narrator tries – and continuously fails – to constitute an existence, 
a substantiality, for himself through narration, through language. But language is insufficient 
for this task, and as the narrator steadily seems to become increasingly aware of this, he 
becomes more and more prone to “gestures of cancellation”, to second-guessing his own 
attempts, “until the point where [he] resigns [himself] to solitude and awaits the demise of all 
voices whatever” (ibid: 44). 
In “The Literature of Exhaustion”, John Barth writes that “for Beckett, […] to cease to 
create altogether would be fairly meaningful: his crowning work, his „last word‟” (313-14). 
Such an abrupt ending of his career, particularly with the artistic intention that Barth implies 
here, would be a near-perfect example of a “silence that is not silence”, of the silent signifier. 
Beckett ceasing to write while at the height of his career, would stand as an extreme act of 
inexpression, through which he would express the intention in his project of failure precisely 
through putting a stop to expression. To an artist like Beckett, an artist of failure, such an act 
would thus be meaningful. However, even if we consider such an act to be a form of literary 
utterance, we fail to take into account Beckett‟s pronounced artistic obligation. Ceasing to 
create might have been a solution, might answer to one aspect of his creative desires – but 
those desires also include precisely that he dare keep writing, that he dare write the failure that 
is language. Thus, by continuing his work, Beckett necessarily fails to produce the meaningful 
silence that would have resulted from ending his career; any literary production is bound to 
failure, and this is exactly why he must dare continue. 
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5. A Coda Worthy of the Rest? 
 
When working with an author the career of which was so significantly involved with the 
ambiguities of ending, it seems almost ironic when some kind of an end finally arrives, when 
the last word is suddenly within reach. As for Beckett‟s own work, it should perhaps come as 
no surprise that his final word turned out to be „end‟10: “The last words of his last story, „Oh 
all to end‟, express, as Christopher Ricks has pointed out, „both a hope and a regret: they 
could mean „if only the whole thing would be over‟, or „how sad that it should stop‟” (Cronin: 
593). As pointed out time and again throughout this thesis, Beckett‟s work is full of 
ambiguities – his very final sentence being no exception in this regard. Cronin points out a 
connection, here, to Beckett‟s own beliefs: 
It is doubtful if he believed in any sort of survival of consciousness, or disbelieved in it either, since 
belief – or disbelief – was not something he permitted himself. He thought [...] that it was better to live, 
and to admit to living, in complete uncertainty: better because more honest. [...] His characters live in 
confusion, and the possibility of an after-life is part of it. (592-93) 
This uncertainty, this lack of both belief and disbelief with regards to a central and ordering 
principle in our lives, may to an extent have been carried over to this thesis. As stated in the 
introduction, a somewhat fragmented and detail-focused reading – rather than one able and 
willing to see a totality, a process, a clear sense of progression – is one possible consequence 
of a mindset leaning towards postmodernism, if that can be called leaning. In this final 
chapter, which one may call a conclusion if one should be so inclined, I shall collect some 
loose threads – and if it should happen that these threads can be tied up, I shall make an 
attempt to do so. That is to say, I shall sum up the most important aspects of the previous 
                                                             
10
 It is worth nothing that this claim disregards any posthumous publications of Beckett’s work. What I propose 
to be his final word occurs in “Stirrings Still”, which is, as suggested by the words of Anthony Cronin, widely 
considered to be Beckett’s final text. 
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three chapters, in order to reach, suitably, an end – most importantly, an end in accordance 
with Beckett‟s artistic ideal, which I presented in the introduction. 
 The concept of the „end‟ has seen some development through the three stories 
discussed in this thesis. In “First Love” the notion is present, but less notably so than in the 
other two texts. Here, whenever something comes to an end, there is also a clear presence of 
continuity rather than finality – and there seems to be no particular desire for that sense of 
finality, such as we have seen in “The End” and “Texts for Nothing”. The end that is the 
father‟s death sets the story off, by precipitating the narrator‟s forced departure from the 
father‟s house. The end of the narrator‟s affair with Lulu concludes the story, as he leaves her 
parlour during the birth of their child, and goes on to another life – of which we know nothing 
except that the baby‟s cries never cease to sound in his head. In “The End” there is a clear 
presence not only of finality, but also of the desire for it. Moreover, the narrator of “The End” 
relates to ending more directly than what is the case in “First Love”: he seems to both fear and 
desire it. This ambiguity is played out by the narrator in more than one way: his extremely 
digressive and detailed narration keeps the story going, and keeps the end at arm‟s length. Yet 
the desire for end, starting already with the title, in a way turns the entire story into an act of 
ending, an endgame of sorts.  
In “Texts for Nothing” this endgame is taken even further: whereas in “The End” the 
physical presence of a (for the most part) conscious narrator is inarguable, in “Texts for 
Nothing” it is almost as if the act of ending itself is what constitutes the narrator – as if the 
texts exist solely in order to end, in order to reach that final word which obliterates all other 
words. In the act of ending there is also a somewhat enticing paradox: as long as the narrator 
keeps ending, as long as that endgame is kept up, he can never reach the end. The act of 
ending works against itself, and in a way works as an illustration of the impossibility of 
desire: the object of desire cannot be attained, because desire is never-ending; if the object is 
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attained, desire changes and directs itself towards a different object. The act of ending is not 
identical in its appearance, but it seems to work in a similar manner: it is an action that has as 
its primary objective to reach the end. But the act itself only serves to postpone the end; there 
can be no end until the act of ending has finished, until it has obliterated itself as an action. 
 I mentioned that the presence of end is more subtle in “First Love” than in the other 
two stories. Where they express a desire to reach the end of expression, “First Love” rather 
deals with the narrator‟s inability to properly express himself at all. In a more general sense – 
as I claimed in the first chapter – the issue is an inherent failure in expression, in language. It 
was stated that love, to the narrator, becomes a language of misrepresentation: no expression 
fits with his experience of reality. In this regard, it is as if language will not work properly for 
him, as if his words lack the necessary connection to their referents. Thus he tries to make this 
connection himself, through materializing his feelings, making actions of the words, 
seemingly hoping that the physical imprint of Lulu‟s name in cow manure will make the 
feelings behind the action more graspable. The “dread name of love” (33), as he calls it, 
represents a language unknown to him, one in which nothing makes sense, yet in which 
everything somehow affects him on a deeper level than what he is used to, and comfortable 
with. That is to say, love affects his thoughts, feelings and actions, because it demands the 
expression that his emotional constipation makes him unable to produce. “First Love” here 
touches upon one of the most basic issues in language, namely that of misrepresentation. This 
issue points all the way back to Ferdinand de Saussure, who claimed that the linguistic sign – 
the link between the concept and the sound-pattern – is arbitrary, and that this “is the 
organising principle for the whole of linguistics. [...] The consequences which flow from this 
principle are innumerable” (Saussure: 68). What this means is, among other things, that a 
word is not that which it refers to; in the words of Tony Myers: “every word is a gravestone, 
marking the absence or corpse of the thing it represents and standing in for it” (84). Every 
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word means something other than itself, and as such every word is subject to 
misunderstanding. There is no inherent meaning in words; rather, meaning must be provided 
by the competent language user. The narrator of “First Love” seems, at least partially, to lack 
the competence needed to make sense of the language, as it were, of love. 
 Whereas „expression‟ was a key term for my reading of “First Love”, one may name 
„death‟ as its counterpart in “The End” – specifically the desire for death, the death drive. 
However, the presence of the death drive is not clear-cut from the beginning of the story. 
Rather, there occurs a seeming shift of the narrator‟s desires at one point, more precisely 
when he gives up on his attempts to be an individual and independent part of society, and 
starts begging for a living. There is a sense of content resignation present in narration towards 
the end of the story, as if an acceptance of approaching death. Having now come to terms with 
an anonymous life, all that is left is to wait for a death which will at last, and forever, 
extinguish that hopeless hope of life, and end the misery. I quoted Blanchot in this regard, 
who claims that the “scorn for anonymous death, for „passing away‟, is really only a reflection 
of the anguish death‟s anonymity provokes” (144). The desire for the perfect death, and 
conversely the repugnance towards deceasing, passing away, is merely a result of a sort of 
fear – a fear not only of death, but of no longer being, of the being-no-one that comes with 
death.  
 I have emphasized the role of inexpression in my readings. The importance of this 
term is related to the subtitle of this thesis, “Desire and Language in Samuel Beckett‟s short 
prose”. „Inexpression‟ refers to the expression of the absence that desire springs out from, that 
absence which is also a presence, precisely through its relation to desire. Inexpression, then, 
refers to the very constitutions of desire – it is integral for desire to have a means of 
expression at all. Peter Brooks claims that desire “never can quite speak its name – never can 
quite come to the point – but […] insists on speaking over and over again its movement 
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toward that name” (61). Desire speaks through inexpression: it speaks the lack that brought it 
about, but it does not speak itself. Lacan‟s triad of need, demand and desire seems relevant 
here: to bring out the inexpression in the text, as I stated my intention in the introductory 
chapter, means to bring forth the part of need that demand cannot express – that which is 
“alienated in needs” and which constitutes “an inability […] to be articulated in demand” 
(Lacan: 316-17).  
 Lacan‟s triad of desire is also relevant with regards to inexpression in “First Love” – 
particularly with regards to the mentioned expressional demand of love. The need – to love – 
passes through the demand – the materialization of love – and what remains is the desire for 
an expression which is relevant and meaningful to love, the expression that love demands 
from him. This yet again points to the narrator‟s emotional constipation as a key with regards 
to the desires in the story: his love is inexpressed, that is to say, in the absence of the 
expression of his love, there is rather the expression of his inability to express that love. This 
lack of the expression of love, then, represents the main presence of inexpression in “First  
Love”: this lack seems to precede and – directly or indirectly – be the cause of all other lack 
in the story. In “The End”, the presence of inexpression is different, and in a sense more 
focused, because it surfaces through a particular expression, a single sentence. Inexpression is 
here locked within the single sentence that ends the story, yet that seems doomed to repeat 
itself to no end: “without the courage to end or the strength to go on.” The hopelessness in the 
desire to end – indeed, the impossibility of fulfilling desire at all – is emphasized by these 
paradox-ridden final words. With regards to “Texts for Nothing”, the question of inexpression 
seems a little more complicated. I have claimed two main desires for the narrator: the desire 
for a story to tell, and the desire to end. However, as was the case with “The End” – and in 
line with the principle of the death drive – the desire is not for just any end: it is a desire to 
find the right words, to find the words to end all words. This is precisely where the desire for 
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a story connects with this specific desire to end: both are grounded in a desire for words. 
Inexpression in “Texts for Nothing” comes to surface through precisely a lack of words – 
words to tell a story, words to express a meaningful silence, and not the least, words to end. 
And in the absence of these words are just more words, words that express nothing. 
 The term „nothing‟ proved to be a key term in “Texts for Nothing”. Furthermore, 
„nothing‟ shall provide a key connection between Beckett‟s stated artistic ideal and obligation, 
and his own art, his literary work. I claimed my reading of „nothing‟ to be the impossibility to 
express without ends and without means. I have also claimed that Beckett‟s artistic ideal states 
a preference for art to express the impossibility of artistic expression free of meaning. While it 
is not entirely true that the one entails the other, there is certainly a more than trivial 
connection between these two interpretations: first and foremost, to express without ends – in 
the sense of „end‟ implied in the above reading of „nothing‟ – is to express without purpose, 
without meaning. Furthermore, albeit perhaps more trivially, to express without means – that 
is, to express when there is “nothing with which to express” – is per se impossible, even when 
disregarding any presence of ends. In effect, this appears to suggest that Beckett‟s ideal is an 
artistic expression of nothing: to express the impossibility of artistic expression without ends 
and without means. 
In The Faber Companion to Samuel Beckett, Ackerley and Gontarski write about 
Bram van Velde that he and Beckett shared “the sense that their best works were driven by an 
inner force that had nothing to do with the will. [Beckett] wrote a few short introductions for 
exhibitions of Bram‟s work, celebrating him as the first to admit that to be an artist was to 
fail.” Van Velde found, in Beckett, “for the first time someone who understood his silent 
struggle and obstinate determination” (603). It seems reasonable to assume that what they 
share is primarily the artistic ideal, the obligation to create in spite of the inherent failure that 
they see in their artistic creation. Their obligation is to express that their obligation is 
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impossible to fulfil; failure is the only option. But in the face of impossible expression, up 
steps inexpression, as a means at least to succeed at failing, “to write only that failure” 
(Casanova: 85): to write the lack – of possibility, of ability, of words, of stories, of ends; that 
is what we seem to be left with when trying to end.  
I have claimed that the only active presence in Beckett‟s ideal is that of obligation, but 
this claim is denied by the active presence of ambiguity, the uncertainty that most certainly 
makes itself present in this otherwise all-consuming and complete lack. The uncertainty that 
makes ending not only an arduous task, but a seemingly dangerous one: certainty does not suit 
a reading of Beckett; my attempt to make a conclusive remark is doomed to fail. I shall 
therefore let Beckett himself make that remark. His statement with which I opened this thesis, 
has a form which makes it near-plausible to call it a Beckettian dogma, particularly as it 
formulates something of an ideal about artistic expression. It seems only fitting, having now 
reached the ambiguous ending, to finish off with another Beckettian dogma: “Ever tried. Ever 
failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better” (Beckett 2009: 81). 
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